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In the present report, I illustrate my research path during the PhD program in Economics at the University of 
Genova and discuss its results. 
The report consists of three independent chapters which reflect the chronological order of the activities 
carried out during the program.  
In the first 2 chapters, two articles are discussed. They belong to the research field inaugurated by Townsend 
(1987), that is, the analysis of deprivation in urban contexts and the relation between socio economic conditions 
and health status.  
The first articlei consists in a detailed analysis of the distribution of deprivation in the metropolitan city of 
Genoa and of its relationship with the health status of the resident population, represented by a generic measure 
of health such as premature mortality.  Information on 14 variables used to assess deprivation was available at 
the level of the Unità Urbanistiche. These are small administrative units with territorial homogeneity and 
historical and cultural traditions which appear to be suitable for statistical analyses. An exploratory factorial 
analysis identified two groups of variables which, according to definitions in the literature, identify the two 
dimensions of deprivation, material deprivation and social deprivation. For each dimension, two indices were 
calculated on the basis of two non-compensatory methodologies, the Mazziotta Pareto Index and the Pena 
Distance Index. Health status was measured through a measure of premature mortality, measured through the 
calculation of age-standardized SMR. The calculation of the attributable risk was used to evaluate the 
proportion of the excess mortality observed in various areas which can be attributable to deprivation, and a 
geographical analysis is presented. The results of the work, in line with the available evidence, confirm the 
association between material deprivation and premature mortality, but fail to show a relationship with social 
deprivation. 
The second articleii presents the results of an analysis of deprivation in Argentine urban areas, with the aim 
of assessing the presence of a relationship with the average health status of the residents Based on data 
extracted from the 2017 Survey on Permanent Families in Argentina (EPH), a continuous survey carried out 
on 32 urban areas in Argentina, five variables were identified, four relating to material and the fifth to social 
deprivation. The Mazziotta-Pareto Adjusted Index was calculated to provide a synthetic and quantitative 
measure of the level of deprivation. An analysis of hierarchical clusters was carried out to group different 
urban areas into deprivation classes and analyse the state of health. The primary measure of the health status 
used in this study was Life Expectancy at birth. The results, in line with the literature, allow to conclude that 
the proposed mixed deprivation index accounts for a significant proportion of the variability in Life expectancy 
at birth across urban areas.  
                                                     
i This article has been published in The European Journal of Health Economics in 2020 (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10198-
019-01139-x), joint with Enrico Ivaldi and Stefano Landi. 
ii This article is the result of joint work with Enrico Ivaldi, Paolo Parra Saiani, and Juan José Primosich  and it has been 
published on Social Indicators Research in 2020 (https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-020-02369-w) 
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In the third chapteriii, a study is presented that was developed in in the research field of contract theory. In 
particular, it refers to contracts in the presence of information asymmetry and the consequent moral hazards 
and it is aimed at providing policy makers with a tool for an informed use of resources while identifying the 
sources of inefficiency and waste. 
The study is focussed on the problem of defining contracts for the provision of transport services for people 
with disabilities in a Principal-Agent context.  The main issues derive from the hidden actions of the agent and 
the uncertainty which is due to the type and  level of disability of the user which give rise to problems of 
incomplete information.  
The work consists of two parts. In the first, the conceptual framework, the theoretical tools and the main 
assumptions are presented, including: the description of a principal-agent relation under asymmetric 
information; the optimization problem of the principal; the description of the causal variables, which are the 
effort applied by the agent in the supply of the service and the disability condition of the user, which, in general 
terms,  is referred to as "complexity"; the statistical tool used to model the probability related to the uncertainty 
which characterizes the service analysed, which is the logistic function; the relation between independent 
variables and outcome variable; and the agent’s risk aversion. 
The second part of the study includes the description of two empirical models which, through various 
simulations, analyse how causal variables affect the probability of the positive result that is the regular 
performance of the transport service, the expected principal expenditure and the expected agent utility.  
The results suggest that, as expected, the more complex the disability condition of the user is, the greater 
expected expenditure of resources is, but the analysis of the dynamics of the contract, which has actually 
highlighted the opportunity for unfair behaviours of the agent, suggests that moral hazard is stronger in 
situations where the user is less complex. As the user’s level of disability increases, the agent is less inclined 
to implement opportunistic behaviours as the uncertainty of the final result increases exogenously.  
  
                                                     
iii This article is the result of joint work with Marcello Montefiori 
3 
 
Non‑compensatory aggregation method to measure social and material Deprivation in 
an urban area: relationship with premature mortality 
1. Introduction 
Health inequalities can be attributed to the different circumstances under which people grow, live, work, and 
age. In many countries, higher morbidity and mortality rates have been reported among the lower 
socioeconomic groups [2, 5, 10, 15, 22, 36, 37, 52, 59, 73, 74]. 
Studies have shown that areas with lower deprivation levels report better health statuses, such as 
improvements in infant mortality and cancer survival rates [5, 52], while those facing persistent conditions of 
deprivation show the worst self-reported health and mortality outcomes [10, 19, 33, 51]. In the United Kingdom 
(UK), studies on deprivation have been conducted by Castairs and Morris [14], Forrest and Gordon [18], 
Jarman [28], and Townsend [79]. Deprivation indexes were adopted in the UK starting as measures of the 
socio-economic conditions of residential areas, based on census or administrative data, and combining several 
dimensions using statistical procedures to identify priority areas and define targeted public programms [50]. 
Subsequently, various deprivation indexes were developed in the UK [14, 18, 79] that measured general 
practitioner workload and capitation, and connected health conditions and health ine- qualities. Today, the 
indexes are applied in numerous other countries such as Spain [57], Ireland [30], the Netherlands [68], Italy 
[12, 33], New Zealand [63], North America [77], the USA [3] and Canada [54]. They are used to measure the 
correlation between deprivation and mortality [8, 23, 64, 74] inequalities in health care services access [16, 34] 
and the incidence of specific diseases [2, 27, 58, 68, 72, 75]. 
In the literature, there is no unified definition of deprivation. Deprivation is a wide concept that, on one hand, 
refers to a disadvantage resulting from the impossibility of achieving functions that are essential for human 
life [66]. It should be emphasized that health outcomes do not depend solely on the availability of goods and 
resources, but also largely on the capacity to exploit such goods and resources [28, 66]. This point 
differentiates the concept of deprivation from that of poverty. Generally, poverty is referred to as the lack of 
economic sources; in particular, relative poverty, which is closer to deprivation, indicates the condition of 
people who are economically above a settled threshold within a certain context. 
As stated by Townsend [78], the lack of goods, services, resources, and conveniences relates to diet, health, 
clothing, housing, house-hold facilities, environment, and work, which are normally enjoyed or at least largely 
accepted as primary goods, and they can be identified with the concept of material deprivation. Material 
deprivation is, therefore, intended to measure objective conditions as direct variables, since they measure in a 
direct way how many individuals living in a given geographical area share a certain characteristic [76]. Social 
deprivation, on the other hand, is defined as “the condition of those who do not or cannot enter into ordinary 
forms of family or other relationships” [79], “and a non-participation in the roles, relationships, uses, functions, 
rights, and responsibilities involved in being a member of a society or group” [78]. 
These elements make more difficult to identify and quantify deprivation. Given the subjective nature and the 
difficulty to detect and measure the characteristics described above [35, 78]. Townsend suggests that analysing 
only material dimension, excluding social deprivation may affect health conditions. Other current analysis, 
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instead, conclude that worse socioeconomic status, considering both deprivation dimensions, is associated 
worse health conditions [54, 61, 62] and with bad behaviours for health [6]. In particular, Pampalon propose 
two distinct measures for social and material deprivation and compare them with premature mortality. 
In line with these premises, the present work is focused on both deprivation dimensions. The contributions 
of our study to the literature are: first, it provides a quantitative validation of the subdivision of the variables, 
chosen based on the previous literature, of social and material deprivation using a quantitative method. 
Second, it is a complete comparison of material and social deprivation individually for the same geographical 
area for investigating the relationship between these two domains and health conditions reinforcing the fact 
that this relationship is not direct and the victims of these conditions may be different subjects. Finally, the 
proposal of using a non-compensatory aggregation method is to evaluate deprivation in small areas. This 
approach is novel and has not been used in the previous literature on deprivation. It allows us to a better 
evaluation of the stability and robustness of deprivation indexes, and, in particular avoidance of compensatory 
phenomena among partial indicators. A compensatory aggregation could offset the surplus or deficit in one 
component, thus reducing the relevant information. 
2. Materials and methods 
2.1. Data 
We collected 2011 Italian Census data from the Statistical Office of the Municipality of Genoa. 
2.2. Model: The deprivation index 
The analysis was developed as follows: (1) choice of the small reference area, (2) choice of socioeconomic 
variables for the exploratory factor analysis, (3) implementation of two non-compensatory methods for 
aggregating variables into two different indexes of material deprivation and social deprivation, (4) 
elaboration of a general health indicator comparing the two deprivation measures, and (5) application of an 
epidemiological instrument to quantify the effect of deprivation on health status. 
Small area 
In the literature, the reference statistical units for deprivation analysis are the small areas that are recognizable 
by administrative borders that preferably present territorial, historical, and cultural characteristics that 
differentiate them from others. Their size allows them to present groups of individuals that are more 
homogeneous over certain environmental characteristics and circumstances than the general data can [14]. 
However, the definition of the geographic area to be taken as a unit of analysis is not clearly formulated or 
universally accepted. In the examples found in the literature, it is a rather heterogeneous dimension and can 
also reach a considerable population size [76]. 
The use of small areas have many positives, but in the interpretation of the results we need to be aware that 
an area classified as deprived contains people not deprived and, similarly, not all deprived people live in 
deprived areas [13]. This is the so-called, ecological fallacy, present endemic in the aggregation analysis [32]. 
Furthermore, the choice is often forced by the nature of available data and non-homogeneous databases, 
which can only be overcome by linking social and health information to demographic data. 
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In our work, the choice of the small area was made to priorities characteristics that consider territorial 
homogeneity and historical, geographic, and cultural traditions and which, at the same time, could be used for 
analysing the phenomena under study. Specifically, the choice of urban units was determined based on the 
old independent municipalities included in the City of Genoa starting from 1926, with an average population 
of about 8500 inhabitants (Genoa’s Office of Statistics, 2016). Urban units represent sufficiently 
disaggregated subdivisions to capture possible territorial differences, for which homogeneous and reliable data 
exist. 
Variables 
It is common awareness that a number of socioeconomic phenomena cannot be measured by a single 
descriptive indicator and that, instead, they should be represented with a multiplicity of aspects or dimensions 
[43]. 
From the analysis of the literature, we identified a group of 14 variables, or partial indicators, already used 
as components of the various previous social or material deprivation indexes although their respective 
operational definitions may be partially different. 
Table 1 presents the variables used, their definition, and the previous studies that employed them. The 
collection of data for the variables identified is the result of an integration of census data and data derived from 
the annual statistics compiled by the Municipal Genoa’s Office of Statistics. As reference year, we considered 
the year 2011, that of the latest census available. 
Grouping the variables 
Factorial analysis assuming a latent structure among the variables estimates unobservable dimensions (latent 
factors) that somehow influence the observed variables [40]. We applied an exploratory factorial analysis to our 
14 variables to analyse the correlations and the latent shared factors among variables. This reflective approach is 
used merely to identify the common structure between the indicators and not to aggregate or to select them 
because this method ignores the polarities, namely the meaning of the individual indicators. We try to describe 
a latent concept, such as the construct of deprivation, using observed variables with formative model. There- 
fore, factor analysis can be a useful tool for understanding the phenomenon, but a composite index of 
deprivation must be created following a formative approach [41]. Four factors emerged, namely, the variables 
‘Low Education’, ‘Income’, ‘Overcrowding’, and ‘Born on the Islands or in South Italy’ are positioned on the 
first component. The second component consists of ‘Old Age Index’, ‘Single Elders’, ‘Resident Foreigners’, 
and ‘Foreigners in Schools’. The third factor includes ‘Families Renting’, ‘Divorced,’ ‘Unemployment,’, and 
‘Buildings in Mediocre or Bad State’. Finally, ‘Single- Parent Families’ and ‘Single-Person Families’ are 
identified under the fourth factor (Appendix 1).  
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• These results confirm that there is a common latent structure among two groups of variables and they 
coherent with Townsend et al. [78] proposal of a bi-dimensional structure for deprivation and is also coherent 
with the theoretical framework used in literature referring to an economic-material dimension and to socio-
demographic characteristics: First dimension, material deprivation: Low Education, Income, Overcrowding, 
Born on the Islands or in South Italy, Families Renting, Divorced, Unemployment, Buildings in Mediocre or 
Bad State (first and third factor);  
• Second dimension, social deprivation: old Age Index, Single Elders, Resident Foreigners, Foreigners in 
Schools, Single-Parent Families, Single-Person Families (second and fourth factor).  
The first dimension collects objective indicators that have a direct effect on deprivation, while the second 
one is represented by subjective variables that can affect the uses, functions, rights, and responsibilities 
involved in being a member of a society or group. 
Table 1 Variables 
Variable Definition Studies that used an analogous variable 
Low education Population of residents who completed junior school or 
elementary school are illiterate, out of all residents 
aged 15 years and above 
Julkunen [29] and Pampalon and Hamel [54] 
Income Reciprocal of the average income of the resident 
population 
Julkunen [29] 
Overcrowding Average number of residents per room 
Jarman [28], Townsend [79], and Forrest and 
Gordon [18] 
Born on the Islands or in South Italy  Residents born on the Islands or in South Italy 
Baumann [6] uses the analogous variable at the 
European level (nationality not included in 
Western Europe) 
Old age index 
Ratio of people aged 65 years and above to people 
aged 15 years and below Julkunen [29], Pampalon and Hamel [54], and 
Baumann [6] 
Single elders Number of people aged 65 years and above and those 
who live alone 
Jarman [28], Forrest and Gordon [18], and 
Pampalon and Hamel [54] 
Resident foreigners Number of people among the total population who 
were born abroad 
Jarman [28] 
Divorced  
Proportion of divorced people, compared with the total 
population 
Pampalon and Hamel [54] 
Unemployment Number of unemployed people looking for work, 
compared with the total active population (aged 15 to 
64 years) 
Jarman [28], Townsend [79], Forrest and 
Gordon [18], Julkunen [29], Pampalon and 
Hamel [54],and Baumann [6] 
Buildings in mediocre or bad state 
Number of buildings in mediocre or bad state, 
compared with the total number of buildings 
Perez-Mayo [57] uses housing conditions as 
a variable 
Single-parent families Number of families composed of a single parent and 
dependent children, compared with all families 




Single-person families  Number of people living alone, compared with all  the 
families 
Julkunen [29] and Pampalon and Hamel [54] 
 
Foreigners in schools Number of children aged 5 to 14 years and born 
abroad, compared with the total child population aged 
5 to 14 years 
Testi and Ivaldi [76] 
Families renting Proportion of families renting a house, compared with 
the total population 
  
Townsend [79] and Caranci [12] 
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2.3. Construction of deprivation indices with the Mazziotta– Pareto Index (MPI) and Pena Distance 
Index (DP2) methods  
In the construction of composite indicators, the choice of aggregative methodology has an important role on 
the final results [44]. A key role is played by Compensability among the variables, defined as the possibility 
of offset any deficit in one dimension with a suitable surplus in another (OECD, 2008). This fundamental 
consideration determines two connected reasons suggesting the use of non-compensatory methodologies. First, 
to keep the symmetry or weights of the variables relevant and interpretable, it is necessary to use non-
compensatory methods [47]. The second reason concerns the fact that, in some cases, some components are 
not replaceable. A compensatory aggregation could offset the surplus or deficit in one component, thus 
reducing the relevant information. The factorial scores in the second and fourth factors (Appendix 1) show 
positive and negative values, suggesting that social deprivation has different features and social conditions that 
affect different types of people. These people represent different victims of social deprivation; therefore, they 
cannot compensate each other, making it better to use non-compensatory methods. To have control over the 
stability and sensitivity of the measurement of the object of study, both a non-parametric and parametric type 
of aggregation were used. The MPI is a non-parametric non-compensatory index, which means that it considers 
variables as non-substitutable and assumes no probability law on the distribution of variables. The DP2 is a 
parametric index, because its formulation is based on the application of a linear regression model. 
Finally, an influence analysis (IA) was performed to assess the robustness of the composite indices [41]. IA 
aims to empirically quantify the importance of each individual indicator in the calculation of the composite 
index, simulating the index calculation removing one indicator at a time. The average shift in urban unit 
rankings is measured. This statistic tells us the relative shift in the position of the entire system of UUs in a 
single number. It can be calculated as the average of the absolute diferences in UU’ ranks with respect to a 







𝑐=1 − 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘((𝐺𝐷𝐼𝑐)                                       ( 1 ) 
Mazziotta–Pareto Index (MPI) 
The MPI [41, 42] is based on the assumption of “non-substitutability” of the dimensions, to which equal 
importance is attributed, and no compensation between them is allowed. This is a non-compensatory 
methodology proposed in 2007 to measure healthcare infrastructures under the assumption that each 
component of the infrastructure is not substitutable by others and, therefore, the values cannot be offset at the 
aggregate level. Subsequently, the authors applied the same methodology for creating a quality of life 
measurement capable of maintaining the characteristics of each variable included in the calculation of a 
synthetic index by penalizing units of analysis that present an unbalanced distribution of some variables 
compared to the average [44]. The MPI is constructed using the following steps: (1) normalization of the 
individual indicators by “standardization” and (2) aggregation of the standardized indicators by an arithmetic 
mean with penalty function based on “horizontal variability”, that is, variability of standardized values for each 
unit. This variability, measured by the coefficient of variation, allows penalization of the score of units that 
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have higher imbalance between the values of the indicators. Finally, use of the standardized deviation in 
reckoning the synthetic index sets up a measure that is robust and little sensitive to the elimination of a single 
elementary indicator [42]. We calculate that 𝑧𝑖𝑗 is the standardized value of each j-th variable of each i-th 
urban unit 
𝑧𝑖𝑗 = 100 +
𝑥𝑖𝑗−𝜇𝑗
𝜎𝑗
10 if the j-th indicator is “positive” ( 2 ) 
𝑧𝑖𝑗 = 100 −
𝑥𝑖𝑗−𝜇𝑗
𝜎𝑗
10 if the j-th indicator is “negative” ( 3) 
Where 
• 𝑥𝑖𝑗is the original value of each j-th variable of each i-th urban unit, 
• 𝜇𝑗is the mean of each j-th indicator and  
•  𝜎𝑗 is the standard deviation of each jth indicator.  
The characteristic of “positive” or “negative” is interpreted with respect to polarity: the polarity is the sign 
of the relation between the indicator and the phenomenon to be measured, i.e. [39]. In the example of Mazziotta 
and Pareto ‘s work, political participation polarity is “positive” (negative) if increasing values of an indicator 
correspond to positive (negative) variations of political participation [44].  
Then, we calculate MPI for each i-statistical unit for both deprivation dimensions as follows: 
𝑀𝑃𝐼𝑖 = 𝜇?̅?𝑖,𝑘 − 𝜎?̅?𝑖𝑐𝑣?̅?𝑖      ( 4 ) 
Where 
• 𝜇?̅?𝑖,𝑘 is the mean value of the standardized values (𝑧𝑖𝑗) of the variables in the k dimension (k=1, 2) 




 i is the coefcient of variation of 𝑧𝑖𝑗 
This approach is characterized by the use of function ( 𝜎?̅?𝑖𝑐𝑣?̅?𝑖) to penalize the units with “unbalanced” values 
of the partial composite indices. The penalty is based on the coefficient of variation and it is zero if all values 
are equal. The purpose is to favour regions that, mean being equal, have greater balance among the different 
dimensions of deprivation indices according to the MPI method 
Pena distance index (DP2) 
The DP2 (so-called P2 distance or Peña method) was proposed by Peña [56]. The DP2 method is an iterative 
procedure that weighs partial indicators depending on their correlation with the global index. The DP2 was 
used in different arguments: economic and social cohesion [24]; environmental quality [46]; quality of life 
[69–71], welfare systems [38], political participation [25], and deprivation [33]. This construction solves a 
large number of problems, for instance, for aggregating variables expressed in different units of measurement, 
arbitrary weights, treatment of missing values, and duplicate information [46, 56, 69]. Moreover, this method 
is considered more robust than traditional methods such as principal component analysis and data envelopment 
analysis as demonstrated by Somarriba and Pena [69] in a research comparing this method with others. The 
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DP2 distance synthetic indicator has many properties: non-negativity, commutativity, triangular inequality, 
existence, determination, monotony, uniqueness, transitivity, invariance to change of origin and/or scale of the 
units in which the variables are defined, invariance to a change in the general conditions, and exhaustiveness 
and reference base [49, 60]. The basis of the synthetic indicator is a mathematical function expressed as  𝐼 =
𝐹(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛),, where I is the synthetic indicator and n is the number of variables, x, that contribute 
information to our index. Starting from a matrix X of order (i, j), where i—the rows—is the number of the 
areas considered in this paper and j—the columns—is the number of variables considered. Each element 𝑥𝑖𝑗 
of this matrix represents the state of the variable j in i statistical unit. The DP2 indicator, providing the distance 
of each area (statistical unit) from a reference base, which corresponds to the theoretical area achieving the 
lowest value of the variables being studied, is defined for area i as follows: 
𝐷𝑃2𝑖 = ∑ {(
𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝜎𝑗
) (1 − 𝑅𝑗,𝑗−1,𝑗−2,…,1
2 )}𝑚𝑗=1                                   ( 5 ) 
• i=1, …, n; (areas) and j=1, 2, …, m (variables),  
• 𝑑𝑖𝑗 = |𝑥𝑖𝑗 − 𝑥𝑖?̆?| is the difference between the value taken by the i-th variable in area j-th (𝑥𝑖𝑗) and 𝑥𝑖?̆? which 
is the minimum of the variable in the m units considered and  
• 𝜎𝑗 is the standard deviation of the variable j. 
Note that the quantity  
𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝜎𝑗
  is merely a change in the origin and scale, and one may also use zero as the 
reference ρ point and [ max (𝑥𝑖𝑗) − mini (𝑥𝑖𝑗) ] instead 𝜎𝑗 a scaling factor without any adverse efect on the 
formula [45, 46]. (1 − 𝑅𝑗,𝑗−1,𝑗−2,…,1
2 ) is the coefcient of multiple linear correlation squared in the linear 
regression of Xj over Xj−1,Xj−2, …, X1, and it indicates the part of the variance of 𝑋𝑗 explained linearly by 
variables 𝑋𝑗−1, 𝑋𝑗−2, … , 𝑋1. This coefficient is an abstract number and is unrelated to the measurement units 
of the different variables. ( 1 − 𝑅𝑗,𝑗−1,𝑗−2,…,1
2 ) is the correction factor that ensures that the composite synthetic 
indicator includes only the new information from each variable, avoiding the duplication of information 
already contained in the preceding variables. Therefore, 𝑅𝑗,𝑗−1,𝑗−2,…,1
2  with j>1 is the coefficient of multiple 
linear correlation squared in the linear regression of the first chosen j over the other successive indicators, 
included one by one. The first variable obtains an absolute weight of unity (1 − 𝑅1
2), the subsequent variable j 
= 2 obtains a weight (1 − 𝑅2,1
2 ), the third j=3,  (1 − 𝑅3,2,1
2 ), and in general, the j-th variable obtains a weight 
(1 − 𝑅𝑗,𝑗−1,𝑗−2,…,1
2 ). The chosen j is regressed over other indicators included one by one. In this way, the weight 
assigned to each indicator follows a precise rule that has the goal to reduce the duplicity of information that 
often afects aggregation methods [46, 69]. Thus, the weights assigned to a variable depend on its ranking, that 
is, positions in the order, making the DP2- based composite synthetic indexes indeterminate and arbitrary [46, 
49].  
Montero et al. [46] suggest the following procedure to solve the indeterminacy problem: 
1. Initialize the weight vector, 𝑤𝑗 = 1 ∀ j = 1, 2, …, m and define ε=0.00001,  
2. Define 𝜕𝑗 =
𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝜎𝑗
, ∀ j = 1, 2, …, m and i=1, 2,…, n,  
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𝑗=1 ,  j =1, 2,…,m,  
4. Compute Pearson’s coefficient of correlation 𝑟(𝐷𝐹𝑗, 𝜕𝑗) between 𝐷𝐹𝑗 and 𝜕𝑗 ∀j = 1, 2, …, m. Arrange 
|𝑟(𝐷𝐹𝑗, 𝜕𝑗)| in descending order and re-index the associated variables 𝜕𝑗 accordingly,  





𝑗=𝑖 ; i = 1,2,...,n; wj = (1 − 𝑅𝑗,𝑗−1,…,1
2 ) for j = 2,3,...,m and wj = 1. 
6. If ∑ (𝐷𝐹𝑖 > 𝑍𝑖)
2𝑛
𝑖=1 ≥ ε  replace DF  by Z go to d), Else: stop. 
As with the previous method, higher scores represent situations of greater deprivation than lower scores. 
Thus defined, the DP2 is the sum of the distances between the values of variable i in the territory j and the 
minimum values for the variables in all territories, weighted by the unexplained variance of Xi and the variance 
Xi. A greater distance from the worst theoretical condition shows a higher DP2 value, indicating an high index 
value, whereas, a lower distance from the worst theoretical condition describes a scarce level of DP2.  
Class aggregation  
We classified our urban units using hierarchical clustering analysis to facilitate comparisons between the two 
measures of deprivation. We chose Ward’s method because we wanted to minimize within-cluster variance. 
Specifically, we identified clusters of units based on the distance between units’ measures of social and 
material deprivation [48, 80]. 
2.4. Mortality ratio standardized by age 
 We used premature mortality for the comparison of deprivation and health conditions. Premature mortality 
refers to the death of people under a specific age threshold, which is usually less than the average age of death 
in a certain population. The cut-off point to define a premature death was set at 65 years of age. This is a 
commonly used threshold in the literature and in institutional settings [8, 14, 19]. Specifically, we employed 
the age-standardized mortality ratio (SMR), which is a relative index of mortality, expressing the mortality 
experience of the study population relative to that of a comparison (‘standard’) population. SMR is the ratio 
between the observed deaths in a given territory and the expected deaths calculated with an indirect 
standardization based on age distribution in that territory. The ratio was calculated using the observed and 
expected deaths in each i-th urban unit for each t-th age class. In each urban unit, the SMR is equal to the sum 




                                   ( 6 ) 
Where 𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑡 are the observed death and 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 are the expected deaths. 
In view of the small size of the units of analysis, SMR was calculated over the 3-year period from 2011 to 
2013 to give stability to the indicator, thus avoiding, for example, the possible overestimation of mortality in 
very small areas due to particular events. 
Attributable risk  
Attributable risk is an epidemiological tool that identifies the fraction of total disease experience in the 
population that would not have occurred if the effect associated with the risk factor of interest was absent [11] 
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and allows estimating either the proportion of cases attributed to (or caused by) the exposure factor or the 
proportion of cases that could be prevented if the exposure factor was eliminated [20]. This approach was used 
in our work to identify to what extent mortality in each deprivation class can be statistically explained by the 
level of deprivation of the class, that is, how many deaths can be attributed to a deprived living condition. The 
procedure involves taking as reference the minimum value of the SMR in the first class and, based on this 
value, estimating the expected deaths in the other deprivation classes as a product of the residents included in 
the class and the SMR of the first class. The deaths attributable to a deprivation level greater than the reference 
level represent the difference between the deaths observed in the class and the expected deaths. The risk 
attributable to deprivation in each class is, therefore, the percentage ratio between the deaths attributable to 
deprivation and the observed deaths. 
3. Results and discussion  
Comparison of methodologies Appendixes 3 and 4 show the social and material deprivation indexes (SDI 
and MDI) resulting from the aggregation of variables under the two different methodologies. Using 
Spearman’s correlation coefficient—which links the ranks of the two distributions—the aggregation 
methodologies were compared. Between SDI (MPI) and SDI (DP2), the correlation coefficient is 0.856, and 
between MDI (MPI) and MDI (DP2) it is 0.983. The two indicators, which use different methodologies, show 
strongly correlated results. For clarity, the results showed thereafter refer to the indexes calculated using the 
MPI method, which showed more robust results in influence analysis. As we can see in Table 2, DP2 is the 
more sensitive index. MPI is less sensitive to inclusion or exclusion of individual indicators. Regarding 




Table 2 Influence analysis 
Material Dimension 
Individual indicator MPI DP2 
Income 1.86 2.62 
Low education 1.83 2.17 
Overcrowding 2.39 3.63 
Born on the Islands or South Italy 2.39 2.56 
Families renting 1.97 3.30 
Divorced 3.72 5.04 
Unemployment 1.83 1.27 
Buildings in mediocre or bad state 3.44 4.65 
Mean 2.43 3.15 
Standard deviation 0.65 0.95 
Social Dimension 
Individual indicator MPI DP2 
Old age index 10.62 11.30 
Single elders 9.46 11.80 
Resident foreigners 7.58 13.27 
Foreigners in school 8.54 12.00 
Single-parent families 11.77 8.45 
Single-person families 3.97 9.94 
Mean 8.66 11.13 
Standard deviation 2.50 1.55 
Geographic representation of results 
A first comparison of the two dimensions of deprivation (social and material) through Spearman’s coefficient 
shows a low degree of correlation (− 0.110) and suggests that material and social deprivation should be kept 
separate. Through cluster analysis, five classes of increasing deprivation were identified for each dimension 
(Appendix 5), from the wealthy to the highly deprived class, as shown in Figs. 1 and Appendix 3. No 
relationship emerges between the two different dimensions of deprivation at the geographic level. In fact, it is 
not possible to record a correspondence between high levels for one dimension and the other. Indeed, in some 
areas, there are discordant levels of material and social deprivation. Materially deprived area are not necessarily 




Figure 1 Geographical distribution of Material Deprivation 
 
Comparison between the deprivation index and SMR 
Comparison between the measure of material deprivation and the health indicator was initially explored for 
all urban units considered individually. Overall, MD and SMR were positively correlated (Spearman’s 
correlation=0.583) in urban unit analysis. When we calculated SMR within deprivation classes, SMR was 
higher for the classes with higher deprivation. This class analysis shows early mortality in areas with 
unfavorable material conditions. However, very different results were observed with respect to social 
deprivation and SMR. There is no correlation between the two measures (Spearman’s correlation=−0.098) at 
the urban unit level, or in the class-level analysis (Table 4). Very different results are found by comparing the 
social indicator with the health measure. At the urban unit level, there is no linear correlation between the two 
measures (Spearman’s coefficient equal to −0.098), and Table 3 shows that, even at the level of classes, no 
Figure 2 Geographical Distribution of Social Deprivation 
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relationship between social deprivation and health conditions exists (Fig. 3). 








(age < 65) 
1 0.71 1 1.40 
2 0.85 2 0.91 
3 1.01 3 0.99 
4 1.15 4 1.05 
5 1.58 5 0.97 
 
 
Figure 3 Representation of Standardized Mortality Ratio classes 
Material deprivation and attributable risk  
In view of the results, an instrument was used to identify the risk attributable to a given factor in the context 
of reference [11]. This allows us to identify how much mortality in each class of material deprivation can be 
explained by the material deprivation of the class, that is, how many deaths can be attributed to a materially 
deprived life (Table 4). The last column in Table 4 shows, for each class, the percentage of premature deaths 
that can be explained by living in worse deprivation than the first class (i.e. the most favourable condition). In 
the fifth class, about 154 deaths can be attributed to deprivation: that is, 55% of the observed deaths may be 
motivated by living in worse conditions. This is a risk related to the reference context, and while statistical 
processing cannot provide incontrovertible evidence, it can be a useful tool to analyses and quantify the effects.
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Expected deaths if 
everyone had the 
same deprivation 













(deaths caused by 
deprivation/obser
ved deaths) (%) 
1 296 0.71 1 296    0 0 
2 398 0.85 1.19 334.27 63.72  16 
3 981 1.01 1.41 694.87 286.13 29 
4 498 1.15 1.61 308.07 189.92 38 
5 280 1.58 2.22 125.78 154.21 55 
Genoa 2453 – – 1,759.01 693.99 28 
The results obtained in this study appear to be in line with the economic, sociological, and epidemiological 
literature. Material deprivation is found to be correlated with health outcomes in many studies. This 
relationship is present both when health is measured in a generic way through mortality by any cause [8, 10, 
23, 33, 64, 74,9, 31] and when specific pathologies are considered [2, 4, 27, 58, 68, 72, 75]. Our work provides 
an instant refection of the metropolitan reality of Genoa with an informative purpose that captures the 
distribution of deprivation. From a material viewpoint, the most deprived areas are located in the industrial or 
formerly industrial areas and, in particular, public housing neighbourhoods linked to industrial development 
in the western part of the city. Socially deprived areas are located in some areas of the historic centre and the 
immediate periphery, which are characterized by high concentration of immigrants and residential 
neighbourhoods and strong presence of elderly residents. A contribution of our study, through the simultaneous 
comparison of material and social deprivation in the same geographical area, revealing that in the most 
materially deprived areas there is no equivalent social deprivation, reinforces the fact that the relationship 
between the two conditions is not direct and the victims of these conditions are different subjects. As previously 
found, there are different forms of marginalization [79], which can manifest in different situations of social 
exclusion, such as lack of social networks, lack of family support, isolation, and racism. The case of social 
deprivation is more emblematic; Pampalon found an association between social deprivation and premature 
mortality [54] but, in our case, is not possible to attribute any direct influence on mortality to an unfavourable 
social condition. Since no trend has been observed, the results suggest that the social index refers to dimensions 
that are not relevant to mortality. Similar considerations are made by Townsend et al. [78], who excludes the 
social dimension from the deprivation index and opts for an exclusively material index to explain mortality 
when building a model of deprivation directly linked to health. It remains to be verified whether living under 
social deprivation may have long-term health effects or it results in an increased risk to health, as suggested 
by Baumann et al. [6], or in increased costs for the community [76]. However, it is widely demonstrated that 
living under material and social deprivation can enhance the behaviours strongly related to the onset of serious 
pathologies [6, 61, 62]. This study, in addition, underlines the methodological importance of non-
compensatory methods applied to represent deprivation at the area level. Each partial indicator should not 
compensate the others, because each represents a different “source” of deprivation. The use of a non-
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compensatory aggregation method may be well suited for such types of analyses. This study is not free from 
limitations. From a methodological viewpoint, it would be important to evaluate how the choice of a small 
area can impact on the results of the analysis [65] and pay attention to the so-called ecological fallacy [13]. On 
the other hand, studies have shown that area-level deprivation not only serves as an individual-level proxy 
when data are unavailable but also has its own impact [21, 72]. Moreover, policy decisions regarding, for 
example, resource allocation and healthcare organisations, are made on a larger scale than the individual or 
census section levels. Second, deprivation indexes are a synthetic measure that simply encapsulates the 
multidimensionality of reality and, therefore, can also present interpretation problems. 
Furthermore, the proposed methodology applies solely to the metropolitan urban case, particularly with 
regard to the choice of variables used. In fact, some variables refer to the social or economic conditions that 
result in unfavourable situations in an urban context but not a rural one [7]. For example, housing tenure has 
been indicated as a biased measure of deprivation in the rural context [53], and low level of education in the 
context of small isolated urban unit towns is often not associated with poor economic conditions. This is 
because informal training exists in such contexts, which results in individual/family businesses or alternative 
work solutions that do not work well in urban realities but constitute the basis of societies in nonmetropolitan 
contexts [67]. However, some studies have shown that it is possible to test the ability of a small area deprivation 
index to describe deprivation even in rural areas [7]. Even though this study has limitations, it has potential 
implications for public health and health care policy in particular for the use of appropriate indexes to account 
for inequalities and resource allocation. 
4. Conclusions  
The results are in line with the literature, which show that the higher mortality rates are present among lower 
socioeconomic groups. A part of the health inequalities can be attributed to the different socioeconomic 
conditions under which people live. Considering a non-compensatory methodology and both deprivation 
domains (material and social) is important because it provides the ability to better capture the role of each 
deprivation component and of the two domains of disadvantage that affect health outcomes and create 
inequalities in life conditions. Material deprivation, as prior literature points out, is associated with lower health 
outcomes. The index of social deprivation measured in this work shows a weaker association with health 
outcomes. These results are in line with the considerations of Townsend et al. [78], who excluded the social 
dimension from the deprivation index to explain mortality when building a model of deprivation directly linked 
to health. However, the possibilities that living under social deprivation may result in long-term health effects; 
increased risk to health, as suggested by Baumann [6], and increased costs for the community [76] remain to 
be verified. Further developments in the analysis of the phenomena of material and social deprivation may 
concern the methodological and dynamic aspects of the indicators to turn them into usable tools, both 
politically and technically. Thus, we recommend that future works analyse the two domains separately and 
examine the relationship between material and social deprivation over time. It could be useful to evaluate 
deprivation domains over time following the stacking deprivation method [33, 51]. In conclusion, health 
inequalities are inevitable, but health status differences arising from socioeconomic conditions should be 
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considered unfair and avoided or reduced by employing active social policies [1, 36, 76]. Adequate social and 
economic policies can be just as important as health care, because income, job position, education, and the 
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Appendix 1  
Table A1.1 Analysis of main components on the 14 variables, varimax rotation, Kaiser 
Normalization, factor structure matrix 
Variables Factor I Factor II Factor III Factor IV 
Low education 0.973 0.120 0.005 0.023 
Income 0.883 0.285 0.175 0.293 
Overcrowding 0.873 0.156 - 0.063 - 0.017 
Born on the Islands or 0.751 0.337 0.236 - 0.134 
Old Age Index - 0.201 - 0.884 - 0.115 - 0.128 
Single elders - 0.360 - 0.830 - 0.049 0.085 
Resident foreigners 0.025 0.618 0.338 0.614 
Foreigners in school 0.273 0.598 0.285 0.505 
Families renting 0.309 0.268 0.739 - 0.147 
Divorced - 0.400 - 0.193 0.762 0.088 
Unemployment 0.603 0.306 0.654 0.010 
Buildings in Mediocre or 
bad state 
0.148 0.201 0.648 0.107 
Single-parent families - 0.176   - 0.035 0.348 - 0.789 
Single-person families - 0.390  0.019 0.459 0.753 
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Appendix 2  
Table A2.1 Explained total variance: extraction method analysis of main components 
 Total % of variance Cumulative % 
1 4.22 29.444 29.444 
2 2.687 19.191 48.635 
3 2.539 18.132 66.768 






Table A3.1 MPI Index: Material and Social Deprivation 
UU UU Name 
MPI  
Material 




39 S.VINCENZO 87,07 19 MOREGO 83,47 
40 CARIGNANO 87,16 12 BORZOLI OVEST 89,06 
65 PUGGIA 87,43 20 S.QUIRICO 89,64 
38 MANIN 88,64 52 S.EUSEBIO 92,48 
37 CASTELLETTO 88,76 56 BAVARI 92,65 
64 LIDO 88,92 54 DORIA 94,05 
62 ALBARO 88,95 23 CAMPI 94,11 
41 FOCE 89,33 57 S.DESIDERIO 94,21 
63 S.GIULIANO 89,46 13 BORZOLI EST 94,36 
36 S.NICOLA 90,15 8 MULTEDO 94,77 
68 QUARTARA 90,70 53 MOLASSANA 95,44 
42 BRIGNOLE 91,51 55 PRATO 95,50 
70 QUINTO 91,98 17 BEGATO 95,63 
1 CREVARI 93,42 11 CALCINARA 96,14 
7 PEGLI 94,26 58 APPARIZIONE 96,36 
67 QUARTO 95,01 4 PALMARO 96,49 
56 BAVARI 95,23 36 S.NICOLA 97,20 
71 NERVI 95,33 7 PEGLI 97,22 
27 BELVEDERE 95,96 48 FORTE QUEZZI 97,44 
69 CASTAGNA 96,40 51 MONTESIGNANO 97,85 
66 STURLA 96,41 37 CASTELLETTO 98,07 
58 APPARIZIONE 97,19 6 CASTELLUCCIO 98,22 
25 S.GAETANO 97,33 38 MANIN 98,44 
61 S.MARTINO 97,66 3 CA NUOVA 98,45 
6 CASTELLUCCIO 97,75 1 CREVARI 98,46 
21 PONTEDECIMO 98,13 68 QUARTARA 98,59 
43 S.AGATA 98,33 30 S.TEODORO 98,61 
8 MULTEDO 98,43 45 QUEZZI 98,61 
4 PALMARO 99,00 16 TEGLIA 98,85 
44 S.FRUTTUOSO 99,18 2 VOLTRI 98,86 
32 OREGINA 99,52 65 PUGGIA 98,89 
10 S.GIOVANNI BATTISTA 99,58 21 PONTEDECIMO 98,95 
2 VOLTRI 99,87 10 
S.GIOVANNI 
BATTISTA 99,37 
55 PRATO 100,06 34 MADDALENA 99,43 
30 S.TEODORO 100,12 5 PRA' 99,45 
11 CALCINARA 100,19 22 CORNIGLIANO 99,46 
12 BOZOLI OVEST 100,49 69 CASTAGNA 99,51 
60 CHIAPPETO 100,52 33 PRE' 99,68 
15 RIVAROLO 100,77 70 QUINTO 99,87 
28 S.BARTOLOMEO 101,07 63 S.GIULIANO 99,95 
59 BORGORATTI 101,34 35 MOLO 100,21 
9 SESTRI 101,37 31 LAGACCIO 100,35 
53 MOLASSANA 101,41 14 CERTOSA 100,39 
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48 FORTE QUEZZI 101,42 40 CARIGNANO 100,49 
31 LAGACCIO 101,61 15 RIVAROLO 100,51 
47 MARASSI 101,88 62 ALBARO 100,53 
57 S.DESIDERIO 101,93 27 BELVEDERE 100,57 
34 MADDALENA 102,14 9 SESTRI 100,80 
51 MONTESIGNANO 102,47 60 CHIAPPETO 101,09 
46 FEREGGIANO 102,60 64 LIDO 101,17 
26 SAMPIERDARENA 102,82 32 OREGINA 101,42 
23 CAMPI 103,43 67 QUARTO 101,49 
50 PANTALEO 103,50 46 FEREGGIANO 101,81 
52 S.EUSEBIO 103,56 71 NERVI 101,95 
5 PRA' 103,76 29 ANGELI 101,97 
13 BORZOLI EST 103,90 66 STURLA 102,31 
14 CERTOSA 103,99 25 S.GAETANO 102,52 
54 DORIA 104,08 44 S.FRUTTUOSO 102,63 
16 TEGLIA 104,24 49 PARENZANO 102,70 
45 QUEZZI 104,96 26 SAMPIERDARENA 102,92 
20 S.QUIRICO 105,00 61 S.MARTINO 103,06 
24 CAMPASSO 105,10 39 S.VINCENZO 103,26 
35 MOLO 105,20 59 BORGORATTI 103,55 
22 CORNIGLIANO 105,68 18 BOLZANETO 103,56 
49 PARENZANO 105,76 28 S.BARTOLOMEO 104,32 
17 BEGATO 108,37 42 BRIGNOLE 104,67 
33 PRE' 108,43 41 FOCE 105,12 
29 ANGELI 109,28 24 CAMPASSO 105,24 
18 BOLZANETO 109,45 50 PANTALEO 105,32 
19 MOREGO 109,90 43 S.AGATA 105,36 






 Table A4 DP2 Index: Material and Social Deprivation 
UU UU Name 
DP2 
 Material 




40 CARIGNANO 3,60 19 MOREGO 0,41 
39 S.VINCENZO 3,68 20 S.QUIRICO 2,33 
37 CASTELLETTO 3,83 56 BAVARI 2,99 
65 PUGGIA 4,06 12 BOZOLI OVEST 3,68 
36 S.NICOLA 4,12 13 BORZOLI EST 4,05 
41 FOCE 4,66 35 MOLO 4,16 
38 MANIN 4,91 34 MADDALENA 4,17 
63 S.GIULIANO 4,96 54 DORIA 4,23 
62 ALBARO 5,05 55 PRATO 4,45 
64 LIDO 5,19 52 S.EUSEBIO 4,56 
42 BRIGNOLE 5,24 58 APPARIZIONE 4,68 
68 QUARTARA 5,53 11 CALCINARA 4,70 
70 QUINTO 6,10 33 PRE' 4,72 
7 PEGLI 6,78 4 PALMARO 4,77 
56 BAVARI 7,00 53 MOLASSANA 4,87 
1 CREVARI 7,21 8 MULTEDO 4,99 
67 QUARTO 7,26 36 S.NICOLA 5,03 
71 NERVI 7,48 7 PEGLI 5,10 
25 S.GAETANO 7,49 23 CAMPI 5,13 
27 BELVEDERE 7,68 38 MANIN 5,26 
21 PONTEDECIMO 7,91 57 S.DESIDERIO 5,32 
58 APPARIZIONE 7,92 21 PONTEDECIMO 5,40 
43 S.AGATA 8,22 37 CASTELLETTO 5,40 
6 CASTELLUCCIO 8,26 30 S.TEODORO 5,46 
66 STURLA 8,34 48 FORTE QUEZZI 5,47 
44 S.FRUTTUOSO 8,56 2 VOLTRI 5,51 
69 CASTAGNA 8,59 51 MONTESIGNANO 5,68 
8 MULTEDO 8,60 1 CREVARI 5,71 
4 PALMARO 8,62 5 PRA' 5,73 
31 LAGACCIO 9,00 17 BEGATO 5,75 
32 OREGINA 9,00 45 QUEZZI 5,75 
61 S.MARTINO 9,03 68 QUARTARA 5,84 
2 VOLTRI 9,14 29 ANGELI 5,85 
11 CALCINARA 9,16 16 TEGLIA 5,96 
30 S.TEODORO 9,22 14 CERTOSA 5,98 
10 S.GIOVANNI BATTISTA 9,31 27 BELVEDERE 5,99 
55 PRATO 9,42 9 SESTRI 6,00 
15 RIVAROLO 9,51 22 CORNIGLIANO 6,03 
12 BOZOLI OVEST 9,63 31 LAGACCIO 6,05 
9 SESTRI 9,65 63 S.GIULIANO 6,08 
53 MOLASSANA 9,78 6 CASTELLUCCIO 6,11 
60 CHIAPPETO 9,99 15 RIVAROLO 6,14 





48 FORTE QUEZZI 10,09 71 NERVI 6,17 
28 S.BARTOLOMEO 10,13 60 CHIAPPETO 6,21 
26 SAMPIERDARENA 10,33 39 S.VINCENZO 6,29 
57 S.DESIDERIO 10,36 70 QUINTO 6,31 
47 MARASSI 10,49 64 LIDO 6,37 
59 BORGORATTI 10,62 69 CASTAGNA 6,47 
5 PRA' 10,63 32 OREGINA 6,47 
46 FEREGGIANO 10,71 40 CARIGNANO 6,47 
52 S.EUSEBIO 10,77 49 PARENZANO 6,50 
23 CAMPI 11,11 46 FEREGGIANO 6,56 
14 CERTOSA 11,20 66 STURLA 6,57 
22 CORNIGLIANO 11,34 65 PUGGIA 6,62 
34 MADDALENA 11,37 62 ALBARO 6,66 
16 TEGLIA 11,38 44 S.FRUTTUOSO 6,74 
50 PANTALEO 11,40 67 QUARTO 6,77 
24 CAMPASSO 11,47 61 S.MARTINO 6,92 
54 DORIA 11,53 25 S.GAETANO 7,01 
13 BORZOLI EST 11,77 59 BORGORATTI 7,01 
45 QUEZZI 11,82 26 SAMPIERDARENA 7,01 
20 S.QUIRICO 12,00 28 S.BARTOLOMEO 7,06 
49 PARENZANO 12,03 18 BOLZANETO 7,20 
35 MOLO 12,73 42 BRIGNOLE 7,26 
18 BOLZANETO 13,39 43 S.AGATA 7,27 
17 BEGATO 13,41 50 PANTALEO 7,33 
29 ANGELI 14,56 41 FOCE 7,59 
33 PRE' 14,77 24 CAMPASSO 7,95 
19 MOREGO 15,16 47 MARASSI 8,12 





Appendix 5  




UU UU Name MPI  
Material 
deprivation 
Class of Social 
Deprivation 
UU UU Name MPI 
 Social 
deprivation 
1 39 S. Vincenzo 87.07 1 19 Morego 83.47 
1 40 Carignano 87.16 1 12 Borzoli ovest 89.06 
1 65 Puggia 87.43 1 20 S. Quirico 89.64 
1 38 Manin 88.64 1 52 S. Eusebio 92.48 
1 37 Castelletto 88.76 1 56 Bavari 92.65 
1 64 Lido 88.92 1 54 Doria 94.05 
1 62 Albaro 88.95 1 23 Campi 94.11 
1 41 Foce 89.33 1 57 S. Desiderio 94.21 
1 63 S. Giuliano 89.46 1 13 Borzoli Est 94.36 
1 36 S. Nicola 90.15 1 8 Multedo 94.77 
1 68 Quartara 90.7 1 53 Molassana 95.44 
1 42 Brignole 91.51 1 55 Prato 95.5 
1 70 Quinto 91.98 1 17 Begato 95.63 
2 1 Crevari 93.42 2 11 Calcinara 96.14 
2 7 Pegli 94.26 2 58 Apparizione 96.36 
2 67 Quarto 95.01 2 4 Palmaro 96.49 
2 56 Bavari 95.23 2 36 S. Nicola 97.2 
2 71 Nervi 95.33 2 7 Pegli 97.22 
2 27 Belvedere 95.96 2 48 Forte quezzi 97.44 
2 69 Castagna 96.4 2 51 Montesignano 97.85 
2 66 Sturla 96.41 2 37 Castelletto 98.07 
2 58 Apparizione 97.19 2 6 Castelluccio 98.22 
2 25 S. Gaetano 97.33 2 38 Manin 98.44 
2 61 S. Martino 97.66 2 3 Ca Nuova 98.45 
2 6 Castelluccio 97.75 2 1 Crevari 98.46 
2 21 Pontedecimo 98.13 2 68 Quartara 98.59 
2 43 S. Agata 98.33 2 30 S. Teodoro 98.61 
2 8 Multedo 98.43 2 45 Quezzi 98.61 
3 4 Palmaro 99 3 16 Teglia 98.85 
3 44 S. Fruttuoso 99.18 3 2 Voltri 98.86 
3 32 Oregina 99.52 3 65 Puggia 98.89 
3 10 S. Giovanni battista 99.58 3 21 Pontedecimo 98.95 
3 2 Voltri 99.87 3 10 S. Giovanni battista 99.37 
3 55 Prato 100.06 3 34 Maddalena 99.43 
3 30 S. Teodoro 100.12 3 5 Pra’ 99.45 
3 11 Calcinara 100.19 3 22 Cornigliano 99.46 
3 12 Borzoli ovest 100.49 3 69 Castagna 99.51 
3 60 Chiappeto 100.52 3 33 Pre’ 99.68 
3 15 Rivarolo 100.77 3 70 Quinto 99.87 
3 28 S. Bartolomeo 101.07 3 63 S. Giuliano 99.95 
3 59 Borgoratti 101.34 3 35 Molo 100.21 
3 9 Sestri 101.37 3 31 Lagaccio 100.35 
3 53 Molassana 101.41 3 14 Certosa 100.39 
3 48 Forte quezzi 101.42 3 40 Carignano 100.49 
3 31 Lagaccio 101.61 3 15 Rivarolo 100.51 
3 47 Marassi 101.88 3 62 Albaro 100.53 
3 57 S. Desiderio 101.93 3 27 Belvedere 100.57 
3 34 Maddalena 102.14 3 9 Sestri 100.8 
3 51 Montesignano 102.47 3 60 Chiappeto 101.09 
3 46 Fereggiano 102.6 3 64 Lido 101.17 
3 26 Sampierdarena 102.82 3 32 Oregina 101.42 
4 23 Campi 103.43 4 67 Quarto 101.49 
4 50 Pantaleo 103.5 4 46 Fereggiano 101.81 
4 52 S. Eusebio 103.56 4 71 Nervi 101.95 
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4 5 Pra’ 103.76 4 29 Angeli 101.97 
4 13 Borzoli EST 103.9 4 66 Sturla 102.31 
4 14 Certosa 103.99 4 25 S. Gaetano 102.52 
4 54 Doria 104.08 4 44 S. Fruttuoso 102.63 
4 16 Teglia 104.24 4 49 Parenzano 102.7 
4 45 Quezzi 104.96 4 26 Sampierdarena 102.92 
4 20 S. Quirico 105 4 61 S. Martino 103.06 
4 24 Campasso 105.1 4 39 S. Vincenzo 103.26 
4 35 Molo 105.2 4 59 Borgoratti 103.55 
4 22 Cornigliano 105.68 4 18 Bolzaneto 103.56 
4 49 Parenzano 105.76 4 28 S. Bartolomeo 104.32 
5 17 Begato 108.37 5 42 Brignole 104.67 
5 33 Pre’ 108.43 5 41 Foce 105.12 
5 29 Angeli 109.28 5 24 Campasso 105.24 
5 18 Bolzaneto 109.45 5 50 Pantaleo 105.32 
5 19 Morego 109.9 5 43 S. Agata 105.36 




Health and Deprivation: A New Approach Applied to 32 Argentinian Urban Areas 
1. Introduction 
That poverty and deprivation are relative in both time and space is widely agreed since the pioneering 
work of Townsend (1962) and Runciman (1966). What they consist of varies over time and is dependent on 
the social situation in which it is experienced. Cognitive, economical, and relational, all are possible 
dimensions of the concept of ‘deprivation’ or ‘poverty’. From these first lines, it is clear that to measure 
poverty or deprivation accurately, surveys or censuses must be used that establish both the normal or average 
standard of living of the majority in a society/culture and any “enforced” reductions in this standard due to 
lack of resources (Gordon 1995). The objective is to classify high-risk populations, or the areas in which they 
live, to inform policy makers to supply a combination of social and material resources to enhance their quality 
of life. 
The paper is divided into several parts. In the first, we provide an overview of the concepts of deprivation 
and poverty; the second describes the variables we used and the technics of aggregation. The results, derived 
from the application of the proposed methodological approach, are then presented and discussed in the last 
part of the paper. 
2. Poverty and Deprivation 
Poverty has been one of the phenomena that attracted the most attention of social research- ers—suffice 
it to think to the work of Booth (1889), Du Bois (1899), Rowntree (1901, 1941), Rowntree and Kendall 
(1917), and Bowley (1915)—and one of the first for which efforts have been made to define it, mainly through 
income levels and the amount of the expense. Many authors (Cullen 1979; Rose 1972; Simey and Simey 
1960)—erroneously— consider Charles Booth the father of the concept of “line of poverty”1, even if he never 
explicates how he arrived to determine that threshold: 
By the word ‘poor’ I mean to describe those who have a fairly regular though bare income, such as 18 
s. [shillings] to 21s. per week for a moderate family, and by ‘very poor’ those who fall below this standard, 
whether from chronic irregularity of work, sickness, or a large number of young children. […] The 
proportion of the population shown to be above the line of poverty, I make to be 65 per cent, that on the 
line 22 per cent, while those falling chronically below it into the region of distress are 13 per cent (Booth 
1887, pp. 328, 375). 
Rowntree exposed in a more complex way his proposal; while recognizing the importance of the multiple 
facets of the concept, he kept a focus on physical health: 
Expenditure needful for the development of the mental, moral, and social sides of human nature will 
                                                     
1 As noted by Gillie (1996, p. 728), the criterion was already mentioned in the 1870 Elementary Education Act and used by McDougall (1885, pp. 3–
4). Curiously, in the works of Booth there is no mention of the expression ‘poverty line’, “although it is used synonymously with ‘line of poverty’ in 
one of his notebooks compiled in 1887 (Gillie 1996, p. 715). If Gillie merely deny the use by Booth of the expression ‘poverty line’, Vaughan (2007, 
p. 242) goes as far to state that in his works there is so sign of the concept, neither 
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not be taken into account at this stage of the inquiry. Nor in thus estimating the poverty line will any 
account be taken of expenditure for sick clubs  or insurance. We confine our attention at present simply to 
an estimate of minimum necessary expenditure for the maintenance of merely physical health. This may 
be discussed under three heads: food, house rent (including rates), household sundries (such as clothing, 
light, fuel, etc.) (1901, pp. 87–88). 
However, poverty, as stated by Townsend (1979), “can be defined objectively and applied consistently 
only in terms of the concept of relative deprivation”. “Deprivation may be defined as a state of observable 
and demonstrable disadvantage relative to the local community or the wider society or nation to which an 
individual, family or group belongs. The idea has come to be applied to conditions (that is, physical, 
environmental and social states or circumstances) rather than resources and to specific and not only general 
circumstances, and therefore can be distinguished from the concept of poverty” (Townsend 1987, p. 5). 
Following these arguments, the line of poverty or the disadvantage relative to the local com- munity depends 
from the characteristics of each country and from the needs considered as fundamental in each society. In this 
sense, deprivation is not context free. The point was already proposed by Adam Smith: 
By necessaries I understand not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support 
of life, but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest 
order, to be without. A linen shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a necessary of life. The Greeks 
and Romans lived, I suppose, very comfortably though they had no linen. But in the present times, through 
the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed      to appear in public without a 
linen shirt, the want of which would be supposed to denote that disgraceful degree of poverty which, it is 
presumed, nobody can well fall into without extreme bad conduct. (1776, pp. 399–400). 
Pursuing these arguments, deprivation can be associated to lack of education, to bad conditions of 
dwellings, and even the lack of social relations. The well-known approach by Sen shifts its attention from the 
deprivation of income to the deprivation of capabilities: “Poverty is not a matter of low well-being, but the 
inability to pursue well-being precisely because of the lack of economic means” (1992, p. 110). 
Many scientists dispute the use of composite indicators that lead to the determination of a single value for 
each geographic area, preferring the so-called dashboard. In this case, it is possible to identify various 
dimensions of the phenomenon, all relevant, without that they are further aggregated. From the statistical 
point of view, it is an incontrovertible choice but from the standpoint of political and media is a heavy 
limitation. The easy-disclosure in the media and the immediate understanding by the user are certainly the 
strengths of a unique index (Mazziotta and Pareto 2013). 
Deprivation indexes are a quite simple, cheap instrument to measure socioeconomic differentials: they are 
generally made up of census indicators, easily available, combined using different types of statistical 
procedures (Bartley and Blane 1994). The history of census-based area deprivation indices dates to at least 
until 1971, when the Department of the Environment (DOE) in the United Kingdom used data taken from the 
census to identify localities where a high proportion of households were exposed to adverse social and 
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economic conditions (Department of Health and Social Security 1988). In the last three decades, deprivation 
indexes based upon the characteristics of areas of residence were widely used in epidemiology and public 
health (Davey Smith et al. 2001; Salmond and Crampton 2002). Developed at first in UK (Carstairs and 
Morris 1991; Forrest and Gordon 1993; Jarman 1983; Townsend et al. 1988), nowadays they are used in the 
whole world such as Spain (Pérez-Mayo 2003), Ireland (Kelleher et al. 2002), Netherlands (Smits et al. 2002), 
France (Havard et al. 2008), Italy (Caranci et al. 2010; Landi et al. 2018a), New Zealand (Salmond and 
Crampton 2002), North America (Arcaya et al. 2015; Pampalon et al. 2009a, 2012; b; Torsheim et al. 2004) 
and Argentina (Durán and Condorí 2019). They are used to measure the correlation between deprivation and 
mortality (Benach and Yasui 1999; Bond Huie et al. 2003; Santana et al. 2015), waiting-time inequalities for 
health services (Landi et al. 2018b) and the incidence of specific diseases (Andersen et al. 2014; Jackson et 
al. 2014; Spadea et al. 2010; Su et al. 2017). These indexes have emphasized, among other things, the 
multidimensional aspect of urban deprivation as related to its absolute versus relative nature and its material 
versus social content. 
The use of deprivation’s indices on a geographical base is possible on the assumptions that (1) we can 
infer individual’s characteristics from those of the area to which he belongs, and that (2) socio-economic 
conditions of that geographical area can systematically deter- mine different risks of morbidity and mortality 
under the same conditions2—context effect: see Macintyre et al. (2002). An adequate index is possible only 
if we explicit the meaning of a phenomena determined by the social and temporal context (Jesuit et al. 2003). 
Having a certain amount of resources in a context economically and socially active has a different meaning 
than disposing the same amount in a stagnating reality, for the individual (or the family) may have a different 
degree of capabilities in developing his life. 
Although health inequalities depend on socioeconomic circumstances (Carstairs and Morris 1991; 
Sloggett and Joshi 1994) there is still a lack of understanding of possible reasons underlying the deprivation 
indexes’ good performances (Carstairs 2001). Conse- quently, like Gordon has suggested (1995), answering 
the key question “which index is  the best?” is often not easy. Indexes differ in items included and in the kind 
of deprivation they consider: following Townsend (1987), it is possible to distinguish between material and 
social form of deprivation. The former “entails the lack of goods, services, resources, amenities and physical 
environment which are customary, or at least widely approved in the society under consideration” while the 
latter “is non-participation in the roles, relation- ships, customs, functions, rights and responsibilities implied 
by a member of a society and its sub-groups.” The components of the indexes are direct indicators, when 
representing conditions or states, and indirect indicators, expressing the victims of those conditions or states 
(Townsend 1987), the possession of commodities being valuable only to the extent that it enables the person 
to do or be a range of things (Sen 1987). 
3. The Argentinian Context 
                                                     
2 Both assumptions are called into question: the first by those who warn against ecological fallacy (Lancaster and Green 2002), the second by those 
who think that the effect is irrelevant and not quantifiable   with only census information (Sloggett and Joshi 1994): people inhabiting in a 
geographical area with given characteristics may have different needs, under the same conditions 
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Argentina is politically divided into twenty-three provincias (provinces) and one autonomous city, Ciudad 
Autónoma de Buenos Aires, the Federal Capital of the nation. Moreover, five different geographical regions 
are distinguished in its territory. The “NOA” region includes the northwestern provinces: Jujuy, Salta, 
Tucumán, Santiago del Estero, Catamarca and La Rioja. The “NEA” region includes the northeastern 
provinces of the country: Formosa, Chaco, Misiones, Corrientes and Entre Ríos. The “Cuyo” region includes 
the provinces located in the mountainous area in the center-west of the country: Mendoza, San Juan and San 
Luis. The “Pampeana” region includes the City of Buenos Aires, the province of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, 
Santa Fe and La Pampa. The “Patagonia” region includes the southern provinces of Argentina: Neuquén, Río 
Negro, Chubut, Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego. Besides, each province is divided into departments, a 
smaller unit, with a total of 5127 of them throughout its territory. 
According to the information from the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares3 (EPH, Permanent Household 
Survey), in the second half of 2017, the percentage of households below the poverty line was 17.9%, the 
25.7% of the population. Within this percentage, 3.5% are indigent households, which represents 4.8% of the 
population. According to these figures, 1,611,001 households, which include 7,079,764 people, were below 
the poverty line (LP); and of that group, 316,350 households were, in turn, under the indigence line (LI), 
which included 1,323,747 indigent people. Here we encounter a big problem when studying poverty in 
Argentina, because the survey used to measure poverty does not have a national coverage (Eguía 2017). The 
Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH) is carried out in only 32 main urban areas (Aglomerados) and is 
representative of only 6.3 out of 10 residents.4  
The available data allow us to confirm the existence of a demographic dimension of inequalities and 
poverty that most affect poorest people. This demographic vulnerability is expressed through a rate of fertility, 
adolescent and unwanted fecundity higher than in the rest of the population, with morbidity and maternal-
infant mortality rates much higher. It can also be found many young or old women as head of households as 
well as single parent households. This fact affects not only the accumulation of economic capital, but also the 
human capital. Thus, poor people are disallowed from developing their capacities, deteriorating their chances 
of getting out of poverty. 
“The demographic dynamics of poverty” (Pantelides and Moreno 2009) affects in a special way groups 
that are particularly neglected, as indigenous peoples. Their lack of access to basic services such as education 
and health (including sexual and reproductive health) is at the base of their lower life expectancy. Thus, the 
                                                     
3 The Permanent Household Survey (EPH), undertaken monthly by the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC), is a continuous survey 
that takes place in 32 urban areas of Argentina (provincial capitals and cities above 100,000 inhabitants). The Survey produces quarterly data for 
agglomerates of the population and is the basic source for these kinds of studies and statistical simulations. INDEC publishes the data quarterly. 
4 Furthermore, “since 2010, other urban areas with population over 2000 inhabitants (where a third of people live), are also sampled in the third 
quarter of the year.  However, poverty estimates are not extended     to this sample and this dataset is not yet available since 2014, so it is impossible 
to calculate the poverty rate for this group. In addition, although the rural population represents a relatively small fraction of the total population (9%, 
according to the 2010 Population, Household, and Housing Census), an urban-only household survey, even if the smaller urban areas were included, 
may underestimate national poverty: rural households are twice as likely to have at least one unsatisfied basic need (18.2% compared to 8.3% nation- 
ally). The exclusion of rural areas also means that certain vulnerable groups are systematically excluded: for example, there are proportionally twice 
as many indigenous people in rural areas. In addition, available datasets for urban areas (such as the EPH) do not include questions that would allow 
identifying indigenous peoples or afro descendants. The Population Census is the only source of information to characterize both rural population and 
ethnic groups in terms of living standards (dwelling characteristics, education attainment, among others). Yet this source does not allow an assessment 




Patagonia area is at the minimum rate, a 6.8% lower than the national average. In contrast, the Northeast 
region shows the highest proportion of poverty: 29% higher than the national average. This region is mainly 
of aboriginal or peasant population (Bolsi et al. 2005). 
In reference to some of the dimensions of deprivation, in 2017 the incidence of food insecurity reached 
4.1% of urban households in Argentina, affecting about 2 out of every 10 households residing in shantytowns 
and little more than 10% of households with very low socioeconomic status. In this same year, 20% of 
households did not have health cover- age and had to cut expenses on medical care or medication (Salvia 
2017). 
The deprivation in access to basic services was 30% in 2017, showing a regular decline since 2010 when 
it was 36%. Probably due to the public investment made between 2010 and 2017, it was the households of 
low and low-middle strata that saw their socio-urban integration improved. In any case, almost 7 of every 10 
homes in shantytowns did not have access to basic services. Almost half of the households of marginal 
working class and very low socioeconomic status were in the same situation. There is an association between 
deprivation and lower social class. The working classes tend to suffer from deprivation, and all ethnic and 
minority groups have higher levels of deprivation than the white majority (Fieldhouse and Tye 1996). In the 
dimension of access to a decent house, the deficit reached 17.6% in 2017. It should be noted that 6 of every 
10 homes in shantytowns are in poor housing conditions and 4 out of every 10 households belong to very low 
socioeconomic stratum (Salvia 2017). 
4. Methods 
The analysis of the literature offers several solutions to deduce a priori what should be  the most 
appropriate variables to be included within an index even if the choice obviously is influenced by the 
availability of data, the purpose of the indicator and the significance criteria (Carstairs and Morris 1991; Fu 
et al. 2015; Ivaldi et al. 2016; Jarman 1983, 1984; Landi et al. 2018a; Noble et al. 2003; Pampalon et al. 
2009a, b; Parra Saiani 2009; Townsend et al. 1988; Townsend 1987; Whelan et al. 2010); furthermore, some 
of the variables have changed over time. One objective of this paper is to propose a new approach to construct 
an estimate Argentinian’s deprivation, based on the use of indicators from which the main dimensions of 
deprivation are derived from the literature (Table 1). This approach is applied to the 32 Aglomerados to 
examine the spatial structure of deprivation dimensions as well as its intensity in 2017—corresponding with 
the latest EPH. 
Our analysis is based on data that allows delimiting small geographical units, with homogenous social and 
economic characteristics (Pampalon et al. 2009a, b; Schuurman   et al. 2007). The data are extracted from 
2017 EPH, a sample survey about the characteristics of families. It covers 32 urban agglomerations with more 
than 100,000 inhabitants, where 70% of the urban population of Argentina lives (Pampalon et al. 2009a, b). 
From the analysis of the literature, we identified a group of 14 indicators, already used as components of 
the various deprivation indices, even though their respective operational definitions may be partially different. 
Table 1 lists and defines the variables most commonly used in other indices of deprivation. 
Deprivation has a significant influence on life expectancy in many studies (Benach and Yasui 1999; Bond 
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Huie et al. 2003; Ivaldi and Testi 2011; Lalloué et al. 2013; Landi et al. 2018a, b; Morris and Carstairs 1991; 
Santana et al. 2015; Stringhini et al. 2010; Townsend et al. 1988). Therefore, we have selected six potential 
indicators on the basis of their correlation (Pearson Correlation Coefficient ρ) to life expectancy (See 
Appendix Fig. 2, Tables 4, 5). Variables presenting an inverse linear relation with life expectancy at birth are 
low education (− .285), income (− .348), overcrowding (−.365), buildings in mediocre or bad state (−.302), 
single-parent families (− .452). 
To justify the exclusion of the rest of the variables we may  advance several  rea-  sons. As for the Born 
on the North-East, although those who were born in this region (along with those who were born in the 
northwest region) belong to areas with higher internal migration rates (mainly to Buenos Aires) and have 
subsistence economies or monocultures, their life expectancy does not differ from the rest of the population. 
When considering foreigners in general, it should be noted that according to data from the 2010 national 
census the number of immigrants is low (3.7%), and almost 70% of them were born in neighbouring 
countries or in  non-bordering countries (Peru, 8.5%) but culturally close to the Argentine community. 
Unlike immigration in Europe (9.8%) or in North America (14.9%), the most immigrants in Argentina have 
a mestizo aspect with physical and cultural features that make them more similar to  the populations of  the 
provinces of the northwest and northeast of Argentina, which relativizes the xenophobic phenomena. The 
divorced, they do not exceed 6%  of  the total population. For the rest of the variables (Old age index, Single 
elders, Families renting, Unemployment), it could be considered the existence of different family 
arrangements, such as large households—a family strategy aimed at increasing the labour force available in 
households with scarce resources—or the creation of family/social networks that allow the flow of material 
or emotional goods and services, and whose functioning is especially important in situations of family crisis 
(loss of employment, serious economic problems, serious illnesses, disabilities, deaths, etc.). 
Hence, our index is composed of four variables aimed at represent material deprivation (Low education, 
Income, Overcrowding, Buildings in mediocre or bad state), and of one variable of social deprivation (Single 
parent families), highlighting a context defined more by differences in the “objective” living conditions than 
by social exclusion (Baumann et al. 2007; Julkunen 2002; Testi and Ivaldi 2009).
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Table 5 Indicators and variables used in other indices of deprivation 
Variable Definition Also, used in deprivation index 
Low education 
Population of residents who completed junior school, 
elementary school or are illiterate, out of all residents 
aged 15 years and above 
Pampalon and Hamel (2009) 
Income 




Average number of residents per room Jarman (1983), Townsend (1987), Forrest 
and Gordon (1993), Duran e Condori (2019) 
Born on the Nord-East 
Residents born on the Northest Argentina Baumann (2007) uses the analogous variable 
at the European level (nationality not 
included in Western Europe) 
Old age index 
Ratio of people aged 65 years and above, to people aged 
15 years and below 
Julkunen (2002), Pampalon and Hamel 
(2009), Baumann (2007) 
Single elders 
Number of people aged 65 years and above, and who 
live alone 
Jarman (1983), Forrest and Gordon (1993), 
Pampalon and Hamel (2009) 
Resident foreigners 
Number of people from the total population who were 
born abroad 
Jarman (1983) 
Foreigners in schools 
Number of children aged 5 to 14 years born abroad, 
compared to total child population aged 5 to 14 years 
Testi and Ivaldi (2009); 
Families renting 
Proportion of families renting a house, compared to the 
total population 
Townsend (1987); Testi et Ivaldi (2009);  
Duran e Condori (2019) 
Divorced 
Proportion of divorced people, compared to the total 
population 
Pampalon and Hamel  (2009) 
Unemployment 
Number of unemployed people looking for work, 
compared to the total active population (aged between 
15 and 64 years) 
Jarman (1983), Townsend (1987), Forrest 
and Gordon (1993), Julkunen (2002), 
Pampalon and Hamel (2009); Duran e 
Condori (2019) 
Buildings in mediocre 
or bad state 
Number of buildings in mediocre or bad state, compared 
to the total number of buildings 
Perez-Mayo (2002); Fusco et al (2013); 
Duran e Condori (2019) 
Single-parent families 
Number of families composed of a single parent and 
dependent children, compared to all families 
Jarman (1983), Forrest and Gordon (1993), 
Julkunen (2002), Duran e Condori (2019) 
Single-person families 
Number of people living alone, compared to all families Julkunen (2002), Pampalon and Hamel 
(2009) Duran e Condori (2019) 
 Source Our elaboration 
4.1. The Calculation of the Index 
A fundamental issue, concerning composite index construction, is the degree of compensability or 
substitutability of the individual indicators. The components of a composite index are called ‘substitutable’ 
if a deficit in one component may be compensated by a surplus  in another (e.g., a low value of “Proportion 
of people who have  participated in religious  or spiritual activities” can be offset by a high value of 
“Proportion of people who have participated in meetings of cultural or recreational associations” and vice 
versa). Similarly, the components of a composite index are called ‘non-substitutable’ if a compensation 
among them is not allowed (e.g., a low value of “Life expectancy at birth” cannot be offset by a high value 
of “GDP per capita” and vice versa). Thus we can define an aggregation approach as ‘compensatory’ or ‘non-
compensatory’ depending on whether it permits compensability or not (Casadio Tarabusi and Guarini 2013). 
Compensability is closely related with the concept of unbalance, i.e., a disequilibrium among the 
indicators that are used to build the composite index. In any composite index each dimension is introduced 
to rep- resent a relevant aspect of the phenomenon considered, therefore a measure of unbalance among 
dimensions may help the overall understanding of the phenomenon. In a non-compensatory or partially 
compensatory approach, all the dimensions of the phenomenon must be balanced and an aggregation function 
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that takes unbalance into account, in terms of penalization, is often used (Mazziotta and Pareto 2017, 2019). 
Due the nature of the variables used we opted for partially-compensatory approach: the Adjusted 
Mazziotta–Pareto Index (AMPI). The AMPI is a composite index that allows comparability of the data across 
units and over  time (Mazziotta and Pareto 2018). It is      a variant of the Mazziotta–Pareto Index (MPI), 
based on a re-scaling of the individual indicators by a Min–Max transformation, in contrast with the classic 
MPI where all the indicators are normalized by a linear combination of z-scores (De Muro et al. 2011). 
AMPI make the indicators independent from the unit of measure, therefore, all the individual indicators 
are assigned equal weights and absolute time comparisons are allowed (Mazziotta and Pareto 2016). The 
steps for computing the Adjusted MPI (AMPI) are given below (Mazziotta and Pareto 2016, 2017). 
Normalization 
Given the matrix X = {𝑥𝑖𝑗} with n rows (units) and m columns (individual indicators), it’s possible to 




60 + 70 
 
where xij is the value of the indicator j for the unit i; 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑥𝑗and 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑗are the ‘goalposts’ for the indicator 
j. 
If the indicator j has negative ‘polarity’, the complement of 𝑟𝑖𝑗 with respect to 200 is calculated. 
To facilitate the interpretation of results, the ‘goalposts’ can be fixed so that 100 represents a reference 
value. A simple procedure for setting the ‘goalposts’ is the following. 
Let 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑥𝑗and 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑥𝑗be the overall minimum and maximum of the indicator j across all units and all periods 
considered. Denoting with 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑥𝑗 the reference value for the indicator j, the ‘goalposts’ are defined as: 
{
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑥𝑗 =  𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑥𝑗 −








The normalized values will fall approximately in the range (70; 130), where 100 represents the reference 
value. 
Aggregation 
Denoting with 𝑀𝑟𝑖 and 𝑆𝑟𝑖  , respectively, the mean and the standard deviation of the normalized values of 
the unit i, the generalized form of the AMPI is given by: 










The AMPI has the same properties than the MPI. Nevertheless, the AMPI allows to compute the score of 
each unit independently of the others, in contrast to the MPI where the mean and standard deviation of the 
individual indicators are requested (Mazziotta and Pareto 2019). The ‘price’ to pay for having scores 
comparable over time is that indicators with different variability are aggregated. However, normalized 
indicators in an identical range have much more similar variability than original ones (Mazziotta and Pareto 
2016).  
The final scores are comparable over and normalized indicators in an identical range have much more 
similar variability than original ones. 1 
AMPI is useful to evaluate deprivation changes during different years (Landi et al. 2018a; Mazziotta and 
Pareto 2016; Norman 2010). The ‘price’ to pay for having final scores comparable over time is that individual 
indicators with different variability are aggregated. However, normalized indicators in an identical range have 
much more similar variability than original ones. 
Using AMPI, different types of deprivation are identified and a general measure of dep- rivation, called 
Argentina Deprivation Index (ADI), is proposed to take into account the multidimensional nature of the 
concept. 
Class Aggregation 
In order to offer a geographical representation of the results in our work we applied to both the social and 
material indexes a hierarchical cluster analysis—the Ward method—which is directed to minimizing variance 
within the groups, and defines the distance between two classes C1 and C2 as the increase of the sum of 
squares when the classes are joined (Ward, 1963). In this case, the partition is better considered the more 
homogeneous each class and the more different the classes are from each other. In other words, the higher 
the variance among the classes, and the lower internal variance (in the classes). 
Finally, an influence analysis was performed to assess the robustness of the composite indices (Mazziotta 
and Pareto 2017). Influence analysis aims to quantify the importance of each individual indicator in the 
calculation of the composite index, simulating the index calculation removing one indicator at a time. The 
average shift in Aglomerados rankings  is measured. This statistic tells us the relative shift in the position of 
the entire system of Aglomerados in a single number. It can be calculated as the average of the absolute 
differences in Aglomerados’ ranks with respect to a reference ranking over the 32 Aglomerados: 








5. Results and Discussion 
The results show large variability on the Argentinian territory both in terms of deprivation both in a health 
perspective. Deprivation has a range variation of 44.85 points between the most deprived Aglomerado S. del 
                                                     
1 For the mathematical properties of AMPI, see Mazziotta and Pareto (2016, 2018). 
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Estero–La Banda and the less deprived Ciudad de Bs As. The mean of the deprivation index is 98.47 (with a 
standard deviation of 8.02) which is quite near to the median score of 97.25. It’s notable that the major 
variation is in the tails of the index distribution (Table 2). 
The health indicator goes from a value of 74.25 of expected life years to 77.17 sug- gesting relevant 
differences in health conditions among various areas: around in the ter- ritory we see areas where population 
has a life expectation almost three (2.92) years lower than others, even if it refers only to the Ciudad de Bs 
As Aglomerado, that can be considered a particular case being isolated in the cluster results (Fig. 1). 
However, in the remaining units the variation in life expectancy (1.56 years) is not irrelevant between     the 
best and the worst deprivation score (Table 2). 
The comparison between the measure of material deprivation and the health indicator was initially 
explored for all urban units considered individually. By calculating Spearman’s coefficient, a correlation of 
− .598 highlights the existence of a negative statistical co-graduation between the condition of deprivation 




Table 6 ADI, class of deprivation and Life expectancy at birth. 




S. del Estero–La Banda 118.09 1 74.25 
Gran San Juan 113.27 2 75.06 
Gran Resistencia 109.35   
Gran Tucumán–T. Viejo 108.06   
Partidos del GBA 106.06   
Concordia 105.19   
Formosa 104.65   
Corrientes 103.15   
Salta 101.91   
Gran Mendoza 99.77 3 75.52 
Jujuy–Palpalá 99.56   
La Rioja 99.56   
Gran Catamarca 99.05   
Mar del Plata–Batán 98.94   
San Luis–El Chorrillo 97.70   
San Nicolás–Villa Constitución 97.33   
Viedma–Carmen de Patagones 97.25   
Cdro. Rivadavia–R. Tilly 97.04   
Posadas 97.02   
Santa Rosa–Toay 96.45   
Gran La Plata 96.43   
Neuquén–Plottier 96.14   
Bahía Blanca–Cerri 95.82   
Rawson–Trelew 95.60   
Gran Córdoba 95.44   
Gran Rosario 94.63   
Río Cuarto 94.26   
Gran Santa Fé 94.14   
Río Gallegos 93.96   
Gran Paraná 86.54 4 75.81 
Ushuaia–Río Grande 85.51   
Ciudad de Bs. As. 73.24 5 77.17 
Source: Our elaboration 
The decrease in the level of deprivation clearly appears to correspond to a growing trend of life expectancy: 
in areas with more unfavourable material conditions, the opposite hap- pens. Life expectancy at birth 
increases as the class is less deprived (Table 2); in particular, it increases by 1.36 years moving from units of 
Class 4 to the Ciudad de Buenos Aires, the only one in Class 5; and an increase of almost 3 years moving 





Figure 4 Hierarchical cluster analysis 
Validation step aims to assess the robustness of the composite index, in terms of capacity to produce 
correct and stable measures, and its discriminant capacity (Saisana et al. 2005). Statistical analyses should be 
conducted to explore the robustness of rankings to the inclusion and exclusion of individual indicators and 
setting different decision rules to construct the composite index (Freudenberg 2003). ADI is not very sensitive 
to inclusion or exclusion of individual indicators as shown in Table 3. 
Excluding a variable each time the rank varies by only three units with a standard deviation of .85. The 
excluded variables that show a greater variation on the average rank are the recipient of the income and the 
one-parent families with a variation slightly higher than 4 positions while the exclusion of the variable 















Low education 3.19 
Income 4.38 
Single-parent families 4.38 
Mean 3.40 
SD 0.85 
*Average shift in Aglomerados when excluding an indicator 
6. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to examine and measure the dimensions of deprivation in Argentina in relation 
to health in the urban Argentinian areas, and to propose a new approach to the study of the deprivation. 
Although the relationship between variations in health status and well-being on the one hand and social 
inequalities on the other is well known, there remains considerable uncertainty on their reciprocal 
interdependence and their implication on health policy (Fuchs 2004). With our work we are suggesting that it 
would be more suit- able to use composite indexes of deprivation and that the relation between the latter and 
health must be studied considering the geographical level, and not only the individual one. The results are 
encouraging, and they allow us to state that the deprivation index proposed explain in a significant way the 
variability of life expectancy at birth (an increase of almost three years moving from the more deprived to the 
less deprived Class). 
This study is not free from limitations. First, Aglomerados do not have the same number of inhabitants. 
Second, the ADI is built to cover deprivation in an urban area    and thus it is sensitive to urban–rural differences 
(Barnett et al. 2001; Bertin et al. 2014; Gilthorpe and Wilson 2003), although it is quite common, especially 
for Argentina, to focus attention only on urban areas, as Battiston et al. did (2013). While the proposed 
approach can be replicated in an urban context, the indicators used may be not able to describe deprivation in 
rural areas. For example, housing tenure has been indicated as a biased measure of deprivation in the rural 
context (O’Reilly et al. 2007). Either critiques of indices tend to focus primarily on the subjectivity of the 
indicator election or the weighting algorithms associated with their aggregation (Carr-Hill and Sheldon 1991; 
Frohlich and Mustard 1996; Talbot 1991). Auxiliary problems also include lack of or difficulty accessing 
sufficient individual longitudinal health data, which necessitates relying on area-based statistics to quantify 
individual health patterns at a larger scale (Frohlich and Mustard 1996; Schuurman et al. 2007). 
In turn, this study presents typical limitations from those based on an ecological design, which means that 
the observations and results are based on sample sections and cannot be extrapolated to individuals. Hence, it 
does not determine the effects of con-   text between individuals and the deprivation levels defined for the area. 
Moreover, it is important to interpret results while considering the risk of ecological fallacy because  “not all 
deprived individuals live in deprived wards”, just as not everybody in a ward ranked as deprived are themselves 
deprived” (Townsend et al. 1988). Although a relevant issue, it is difficult to obtain individual deprivation 
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measures and both individual- and area-level deprivation are important determinants of health status 
(Hagedoorn et al. 2016; Spadea et al. 2010). 
Territorial differences in Argentinians’ health are intertwined with a “dual epidemiological situation”, since 
typical diseases of developing countries persist and re-emerge along with other, such cardiovascular diseases 
or cancer, typical of societies with higher life expectancy at birth (Kessler 2014; UNDP 2011). Furthermore, 
we have to widen our sight, including—other than diseases in themselves– the impact that they have on 
household budget in the absence of mechanisms to reduce and to facilitate treatment (Kessler 2014). The 
proportion of households that claim to have cut expenses in medical care or purchase of medicines (for 
economic reasons) exhibits a decrease between 2010 and 2011 with increases and subsequent adjustments; 
households declaring having cut health expenses for economic reasons reaches 29.3% in 2018 (Bonfiglio et 
al. 2019,). Even though this study has limitations, it has potential implications for public health and health care 
policy in particular for the use of appropriate indexes to account for inequalities and resource allocation. Health 
inequalities are maybe inevitable, but health status differences arising from socioeconomic conditions should 
be considered unfair and avoided or reduced by employing active social policies (Adler and Newman 2002; 
Mackenbach 2012; Mackenbach et al. 2003; Testi and Ivaldi 2009), since poverty and deprivation cease to be 
a residual or cyclical problem, remediable through market expansion. In contrast, it is increasingly transformed 
into a persistent and long-term problem, “disconnected from macroeconomic trends and fixated upon 
disreputable neighbourhoods of relegation in which social isolation and alienation feed upon each other as the 
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Table 8 One-Sample Kolmogrov-Smirnov test 
 Low educa- 
tion 































 N 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Normal Paramenters (a,b) 
            
Mean  
.22450 .049572668 3.94785 3.05219 .56614 .12212 .03355 .00725 .29162 .05666 .06076 .02946 .61172 .19561 
SD  .046356 .0161374380 2.909729 .360341 .174980 .029779 .035792 .009379 .069692 .009228 .024683 .033993 .074248 .051073 
Most extreme differences             
Absolute  .098 .151 .123 .106 .111 .107 .221 .226 .117 .099 .123 .231 .162 .147 
Positive  .066 .151 .123 .100 .111 .107 .221 .226 .102 .099 .123 .231 .093 .147 
Negative  − .098 − .123 − .092 − .106 − .077 − .054 − .188 − .220 − .117 − .076 − .106 − .199 − .162 − .139 
Kolmogorov– Smirnov Z .555 .852 .693 .599 .629 .603 1.250 1.277 .663 .560 .697 1.308 .918 .829 
Asymp. 
Sig (2-tailed) 
















































































1 ,238 ,172 ,149 ,075 ,176 -,337 -,304 -,391 ,053 ,059 ,134 -,036 ,006 -,285 




,172 -,199 1 -,010 
-
,284 
-,261 ,032 -,216 -,033 -,049 -,361 -,276 -,075 ,102 ,210 
Overcrow
ding 
,149 -,092 -,010 1 
-
,546 
-,483 -,354 -,543 -,511 -,584 -,127 ,564 ,784 -,772 -,365 
Old age 
index 
,075 ,367 -,284 -,546 1 ,973 -,090 ,291 ,355 ,450 ,271 -,203 -,748 ,731 ,159 
Single 
elders 
,176 ,419 -,261 -,483 ,973 1 -,144 ,235 ,308 ,433 ,277 -,172 -,720 ,693 ,152 
Resident 
foreigners 
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-
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-,304 -,176 -,216 -,543 ,291 ,235 ,658 1 ,422 ,439 ,155 -,200 -,401 ,353 ,339 
Families 
renting 
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Unemplo
yment 
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-
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-
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Life 
expectanc
y at birth 
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Uncertainty, asymmetric information and contract design for transport service 
intended for disabled people. 
1. Reference Literature framework  
In the present work a principal-agent problem is presented. In particular, it refers to the provision of a 
service for a specific class of users who have it for free, because it is financed by general taxation. 
We describe a scenario of delegation of tasks and functions (Laffont, 2009) by a public principal to a private 
agent, where the latter is selected on for his specific skills and knowledge of the service to be performed, even 
if these may not be verifiable by the principal (Arrow, 1968). Then we consider an agency context with 
asymmetric information: as Arrow said, the agency problem is interesting “when there is uncertainty at some 
point” (Arrow, 1984) and when there is a conflict between principal and agent objective. Uncertainty refers to 
the fact that one party’s or both have incomplete information because the contract is not able to define and 
control all the relevant aspects for the realization of the service. The conflict refers to the fact that the agent 
act on behalf of the principal but their objectives are not easily alignable (Hart, 1987). 
Asymmetric information indicates that information is not equally distributed among the participants and 
individuals may not have complete knowledge, or effective control, about the causal relationships between 
actions and results. Literature on asymmetric information agrees to assess the existence of two types of 
asymmetry. The first refers to the case where, the outcome is affected by an unobservable action of the agent 
who, then, is able to implement strategic behaviours (hidden action) creating situations defined as moral hazard 
(Arrow, 1984). The second refers to the fact that the agent has private (hidden) information about his attributes 
(Spence, 1973), which can produce averse selection with respect to contractual specifications. We describe a 
classical moral hazard situation in which there is a conflict of objectives, hidden action and uncertain results, 
then a risk must be shared and a bilateral relationship must be defined through a contract. 
 The conflict between agent and principal aims is the prerequisite because in the absence of which the actors 
would find a shared strategy towards optimality for both. The agent effort, being not directly observable by 
the principal, creates the opportunity for strategic behaviours. The result is affected by the agent’s action but 
also by the state of the nature, i.e. some random circumstances which are not under the control of the parties. 
Therefore, the need for incentives to implement a correct behaviour is necessary to make the positive result 
more likely, knowing that the final outcome realization, is not completely determined by principal or agent 
actions. 
We shortly recall the literature inherent moral hazard, risk aversion, and incentive contract theory. 
The concept of moral hazard, known very early in the insurance sector, refers to situations in which there 
is a problem of risk sharing between two contractors and, thanks to an insurance policy, one of the actors is 
able to implement a strategic behaviour i.e. he is able to obtain a benefit for which he does not bear the cost, 
because the cost are paid by the insurance. Arrow (1963)analysing the medical care market identifies as source 
of failure of the market, “special structural characteristics of the medical-care market are largely attempts to 
overcome the lack of optimality due to the non-marketability of the bearing of suitable risks and the imperfect 
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marketability of information”. Institutional support and the availability of insurance policies explain non-
competitive behaviours, such as moral hazard, which ultimately hinds the path to optimality. 
With a different view and a more orthodox approach, Pauly (1968), in addition to not recognizing in moral 
hazard a source of market failure, with a position less influenced by moral judgments than Arrow, suggests 
that moral hazard is part of natural human behaviour. 
Many are the definitions of moral hazard in the insurance field. “Moral hazard problems arise when there 
is imperfect information concerning the actions of these who purchase insurance, because those actions cannot 
be perfectly monitored and the insurance contract cannot specify all of the actions which the insured is to 
undertake” (Stiglitz, 1983), and finally Moral Hazard is “the ability of insured agents to affect the probabilities 
of insured events” (Laffont, 2009). 
The theory of incentives has developed to answer to these problems and it aims to identify methods to 
encourage correct behaviour, as proposed by (Stiglitz, 1983), this fields is characterized by information gap, 
risk, and insurance.  
If there were no asymmetric information the contract would specify every aspects of the action to be 
implemented. In the absence of risk against which to insure, the problem would not arise. If both actors were 
risk neutral and without seeking guarantees against losses (no insurance), there would be no problem of 
incentives because each would bear the consequences of their actions. 
Considering the subject of our work, we are interested in definitions of moral hazard that allow us to expand 
the subject of insurance to different situations, in which the insurance dynamics is realized by an employment 
contract or an agency relationship. Therefore in a more general perspective moral hazard refers to the likely 
misconduct of an individual who can obtain benefits that are partially or fully paid for by others (Cutler, 2000). 
In agency relationships, when behaviours of the participants are not completely observable and 
consequently the contract is incomplete, a problem of moral hazard arises, in addition to the uncertainty 
deriving from the fact that they are not able to completely determine the outcome. Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) 
note that moral hazard problems are not limited to situations of explicit insurance contracts, but affect also 
implicit contracts (associated with labour markets, land markets, capital markets and product markets), and 
that forms of potential inefficiency occur in all these situations. Since the beginning of the debate, the central 
question regards the impossibility, in the presence of Moral Hazard, to reach Pareto-optimal equilibria (first 
best outcome). For Holmstrom (1979) an optimal risk sharing solution is precluded. It is possible to reach a 
Second-Best solution, “which trades off some of the risk-sharing benefits for provision of incentives”. A 
possible solution to the information asymmetry is monitoring the actions, but this could be not possible or 
excessively expensive. What Holmstrom demonstrates is that any information concerning the actions of the 
agent or state of nature, even if imperfect, improve contracts allowing a better evaluation of the actions.  
Stiglitz (1983) describes the non-quasi-concave indifference curves and the feasible locus with an irregular 
shape, typical of this analytical context, and taking up what Pauly (1968) has already said, it demonstrates that 
if individuals have the possibility to buy additional insurance at the same relative price of insurance in terms 
of premium-benefit, they will always to do it. These conditions and the non-complete observability of agent’s 
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actions, determine that an equilibrium may not exist or that if it exist could be different from the standard 
competitive equilibrium.   
As broadly discussed and described, the main candidates to represent moral hazard actions are effort 
variables which positively affect the level of agent's production but at the same time create disutility for the 
agent (Laffont, 2009). 
A strand of literature aims to analyse the problem of incentives, not strictly in explicit insurance contracts, 
but in service provision contracts in order to efficiently reach adequate service standards, which could be 
obtained not only with technical variables, but also through effort variables.  
In the analysis of the health care provision, Ma (1994), considers that the agent, the health care provider, 
can exert effort in various way in order to maximize his own utility, i.e. increasing production or quality, 
reducing costs, dumping patients extremely expensive. Ma, comparing cost reimbursement and prospective 
payment demonstrates that the payment system induce the agent to mix efforts between strategies of cost 
reduction and quality provision. Payment systems are analysed with respect to the problem of choosing the 
best type of contract with respect to the criterion of efficiency, which is not the same between different 
healthcare systems. Chalkley and Malcomson (1996) suggest that the choice of the best contract depends on 
the context of knowledge of the actors involved (such as cost structure, quality of service, and number of users) 
and substantially state that one method may not always be better than the others. Theory is not able to define  
which contracts is better than others but can help to collect information useful to achieve e a contract in line 
with the purposes.  
The financing of health expenditure is a problem whose relevance is gaining space on the political agenda 
both with respect to pressures on the demand for services, and on the supply side (Brouwer, 2019), much 
literature has focused the analysis on payment systems of health care service and on healthcare insurance 
characteristics and consequences. 
There is a wide debate about the health care financing system's ability to act on the moral hazard 
mechanism, because it involves a trade-off between risk-taking and adequate incentives. A broader insurance 
coverage induces opportunistic behaviours increasing the risk and, at the same time, increasing the expenditure. 
It is because people in generally increase their consumption if subsidized. It has been debated since the 1970s 
whether the demand for healthcare services was influenced by the price to be paid. Some study find a certain 
elasticity to the price of the demand for health services is recognized, therefore it is accepted that health 
insurance determines a moderate moral hazard (Cutler, 2000). However, positions are still conflicting. Since, 
it is not easy to isolate the effects of moral hazard and selection on decisions regarding the consumption of 
health services and the purchase of health insurance, recent studies have observed that the largest buyers of 
supplementary health insurance have better health and lower consumption of health care (Bolhaar, 2012) and 




The problem of moral hazard is gaining increasing attention because today a large part of public spending 
derives from delegation contracts to produce goods and services offered to citizens (Brown, 2016), 
consequently, the theory of contracts is applied not only as regards healthcare but in other areas. 
As mentioned above, a fundamental element of the contract theory considered here is the risk aversion of 
the agents resulting from the uncertainty of the results. Applying the theory of expected utility, which states 
that individuals choose between risky options or uncertain prospects by comparing their expected utility values, 
i.e. the weighted sums obtained from the sum of the utility value of the possible outcomes multiplied by the 
respective probabilities, we define the agent's preference system and therefore his choices with respect to the 
benefits and costs involved in the contract. Not entering into the merits of the debates concerning this theory 
(Mongin, 1997)and the assumption that all individual are almost risk neutral if the risk is quite negligible 
(Rabin, 2013), we take, in an instrumental way for our purposes, a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility 
function and we will assume a broadly applied form of the agent’s utility function characterized by risk 
aversion. 
In our work, as we will show beyond, the agent’s utility function depends on the contract reimbursements 
and the effort variable. Since the agent takes the reimbursement as given, the only choice variable is the effort.  
We assume effort, as described by Koopman (1953), with some properties, three in particular, that allow it to 
be included in quantitative problems. Effort can be attributed a quantitative measure and therefore effort can 
be expressed by numerical values. The effects of effort are assumed to be additive and the product of the effort 
is formally represented by a function of the effort trough a particular “return function” (Koopman, 1953).  
Although, the problem of obtaining an appropriate functional form for the effort returns function appears 
obvious. Since it is an exercise in abstraction it seems useful in the choice of the analytic form to apply the 
three criteria suggested by Koopman (1953): the mathematical simplicity of the expression, the generalization 
of formulations applied to concrete cases and finally simply represent the way in which the effort produces 
effect.   
The introduction of effort variables is relevant because it creates a moral hazard problem caused by their 
not observability and their ambiguous impact on the outcome variables. In particular, first effort produce 
asymmetric information between agent and principal. Secondly, on one side effort represents a cost for the 
agent because directly produce disutility for him; but on the other side it affects positively the probability of 
the final outcome and then it is a benefit for the principal and for the agent in terms of the final revenue.  
How the probability of the outcome is defined and from which variables and how it is affected remain 
problematic and can be considered unsolved.  We, based on some assumptions about our variables, will refer 
to functional models widely used to describe limited growth trends. 
There are numerous models describe the dynamics of growth. Verhulst (1838), deeming that a stable 
population would consequently have had a characteristic of the level of saturation, introduced a new growth 
curve model: the equation of logistic growth ( (Tsoularis, 2002). Verhulst’s logistic function model formed the 
basis for several models in various research fields (Berkson, 1944). It has been used to model many biological 
systems (Carlson, 1913; Pearl R. , 1930; Annadurai, 2000; Wacheneheim, 2003); to describe animal and herd 
60 
 
behaviour (Morgan, 1976; Krebs, 1985). Logistic equation has found even economic applications, Fisher and 
Fry (1971)have used it to describe the penetration of new products and new technologies into the market. 
Finally, it should be noted that the logistic function is at the basis of inferential logistic regression models so 
widespread and robust tool to analyse dichotomous outcome variables, in the epidemiological, economic and 
many other fields (Cramer, 2002; Peng, 2002). 
In this work we present a problem of incomplete information, in line with the literature just described, in 
which moral hazard can create the opportunity for strategic behaviour that can lead to non-optimal solutions. 
Our analysis describes an agency relationship for the provision of a public transport service, in which there are 
three participant:  the principal who designs the contract and pay an agent to perform a service on his behalf, 
the user of the service is a specific class of individuals who has the service for free. The asymmetric information 
arises from two elements.  First, the subject of the contract depends on the agent effort, which is not observable 
by the principal. Second, the service user,  is the bearer of specific characteristics that are not controllable 
which have a direct influence on the probability of the outcome, then the agent is not able to establish a priori 
the level of effort that guarantees the service carried out.  
The service we will considered is the transport service intended for people with disabilities identified in 
advance by the principal on the basis of institutional classification. We identify the principal as a municipality. 
The service must be scheduled in advance on a regular basis.i  
The novelty of this work is that, to the best of our knowledge, it is the very first time that the service of 
transportation intended to disabled people is investigated on the light of asymmetry of information and, very 
crucial to our analysis, uncertainty. 
The object of this work is the analysis of the problem of defining an efficient contract for the provision of 
a public service and a critical discussion on how causal variables affect the probability of a particular public 
service (and consequently the expected expenditure of the principal) and provide technical and informative 
tools to support decision of the policy maker. 
The paper is organized as follow: In Section 2 material and methods are presented. First, we describe the 
theoretical agency-model in its general formulation, secondly we go into a more particular dimension and 
describe the two empirical models applied to the transport service intended to disabled people. In Model 1 the 
problem is presented in his simplest form considering only the effort as causal variable. In Model 2 we 
introduce the type of the user as further causal variable and the logistic function as formalization of the 
probability of the service. The results will be appropriately presented in Section 3. Section 4 is devoted to 
discussion of results. 
 
 
                                                     
i We consider the scheduled service so we exclude the uncertainty associated to the on call service (such as characterize the taxi 
service) and every day the number of service to provide is known.  
Users are identified on the basis of the national system of disability certification  
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2. Material and Methods 
The Theoretical Model 
The aim of this work consists in handling the problem related to moral hazard in the context of public 
transport service provision by a private agent for disabled people. So we apply the incentive contract theory in 
the new framework. To do that, we recall the agency theory with asymmetric information and we present the 
general solutions of the optimization problem of the principal. After that, we design two empirical models to 
analyse how the variables of interest affect the realization of the service. 
The Principal Agent Problem 
In a basic agency context, we describe the entrustment of a public service to a private agent-carrier who 
will be remunerated by the principal. The service is aimed at a specific user who benefits from it free of charge.  
We describe the agency relation, widely discussed in the literature, in which the main issues derive from the 
hidden action of the agent and from the uncertainty affecting results. The time schedule of the Moral Hazard 
we are interested in is presented in Figure 1:  principal have a service to be provided and he wants it made by 
an agent, then he establishes the rules of the contract, before the agent’s action, specifying the reimbursement 
as a function of observable results (Arrow, 1984). The agent can accept (or reject) the contract. Once, the 
contract is signed, the agent chooses his action (in particular we focus on the effort the agent puts in his job) 
between a set of alternatives.  The asymmetric information arises from the fact the effort is not verifiable by 
the principal, because he is not able to observe the agent’s action carrying out his task, and that this action is 
not able to determine completely the outcome, because in that case the principal could deduce the agent’s 
action by the outcome obtained. This uncertainty derives from the characteristics of the users which, despite 
the classification of users on the basis of the complexity of which they are carriers, remain exogenous. 
Then, neither the principal nor the agent are able to have a complete information on the object of the 
negotiation which finally depends on the state of the world realized.  Defining a complete contract is not 
possible and it would still be insufficient to guarantee the desired result on both sides (Brown, 2016). 
Therefore, on the first  hand there is a separation or contrast of interests between the principal and the agent, 
the principal wishes a high effort in order to guarantee a high probability of success, while the agent is 
negatively affected by the effort in terms of utility. On the other, the asymmetric information and the 
uncertainty of the outcome leave unregulated space for opportunistic behaviours, since the variable effort is 
the agent's private information.  
 
Figure 1 Timing of the contract 
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We consider a situation in which there are only two possible outcomes w of the service provision, and no 
intermediate solutions: 
𝑤 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑑 
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
Each event takes place with probability p and (1-p) respectively. 
In the main general formulation, we assume the probability that the service is provided depends on only 
two variables: first, a decision variable, the agent’s effort ef ∈ [0,1],   and second an exogenous variable,  g ∈ 
[0,1]i that summarize the characteristics of the user that can influence the probability of the successful 
completion. For both variables we normalize to 0 the minimum level and to 1 the maximum level the two 
variables can assume. So we define the probability p=p(ef,g) which is negatively influenced by the type of 













The Principal objective is to guarantee as many users as possible to benefit from the service, minimizing 
the expenditure. This result is indirectly and positively affected by the variable ef, according to our 
assumptions, through the conditioning of the effort on the probability p. The agent aims to maximize its utility 
that, as we will define shortly, depends positively on the reimbursement and negatively on the effort.  
Considering the principal risk neutral (Rogerson, 1985), we define his objective expected cost function: 
𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑃(𝛼, 𝛽) = 𝑝(𝑒𝑓, 𝑔)𝛼 + (1 − 𝑝(𝑒𝑓, 𝑔))𝛽                                                                              ( 7 ) 
Where 𝛼 and  𝛽 are the reimbursements (denoted by y) that the agent receives according to the outcome: 
𝑦𝑖 = {
𝛼   𝑖𝑓 𝑤 = 1
𝛽 𝑖𝑓  𝑤 = 0 
                                                                                                                                    ( 8 ) 
We assume the agent is risk averse, with a utility function additive with respect to y and ef: 
𝑈(𝑦, 𝑒) = 𝑢(𝑦) − 𝑣(𝑒𝑓)                                                                                                           ( 9 ) 
The utility of the agent depends positively on the reimbursement and negatively on the effort. We assume 
that this disutility, deriving from the effort, is event-independent (Stiglitz, 1983). 
Then, the agent’s expected value of the contract is:  
𝐸𝑈(𝑦, 𝑒𝑓) = 𝑝(𝑒𝑓, 𝑔)𝑢(𝛼) + (1 − 𝑝(𝑒𝑓, 𝑔))𝑢(𝛽) − 𝑣(𝑒𝑓)                                                            ( 10 ) 
                                                     
i Let g a random variable such that cannot be controlled by either the principal or the agent. 
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Therefore, we face a problem of “incomplete contract”, as named in the literature (Tirole, 1999; Schmitz, 
2003), deriving from the asymmetric information and from the consequent Moral Hazard. Principal aims to 
define contractual terms suitable to satisfy the participation constraint and the incentive-compatibility 
constraint guaranteeing, with the minimum cost, the service to the largest possible number of users. The first 
constraint requires that the contract was defined in such a way to guarantee the agent an expected utility at 
least equal to its reservation utility (𝑈0). The incentive-compatibility constraint, which represents the 
principal’s limited information on the agent’s behaviour (Holmstrom, 1979), requires the definition of 
contractual terms able to induce, even if in a context of asymmetric information, the agent to adopt the 
behaviour desired by the principal. In our model we are interested in controlling the variable effort (ef) which 
is neither observable, as we said, nor "objectively" verifiable, not even ex post, by the Principal and therefore 
cannot be found a "direct" implementation through the contract. 
So the Principal, who is able to observe only the outcome, faces a constrained minimization problem, as 
defined by Holmstrom (1979) in the following general formulation: 
Where:  
𝑈0 is the agent’s reservation utility 
ef * is the optimal level of effort 
Given our assumptions on utility and cost functions, we face a concave programming problem. Therefore, 
the first order conditions are necessary and sufficient for the identification of a point of absolute optimum. 
Disabled people transportation service 
The agency problem introduced is referred to a particular public service. We analyse the transport service 
for disabled people which represent a wide category of users for their characteristics and needs, because 
disabled people are not a homogeneous group, they present differences in many aspects, such as the type and 
severity of the disability (Gant, 1992). We do not ignore the problems and the open discussions surrounding 
the definition and measurement of disability (Slater, 1974; Fujiura, 2001) as a complex and multidimensional 
concept (Altman, 2001) and without entering into the debate concerning the classification and the measurement 




𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐 𝑡𝑜  
𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡: 𝐸𝑈(𝑦, 𝑒𝑓) ≥ 𝑈0  




( 11 ) 
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individual characteristics represented by g, these characteristics may create obstacles to the regular provision 
of the service. i 
Since the existence of The International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health - ICF, 
implemented also in Italy, in a completely instrumental way, we use a broad and generic conceptualization of 
disability which allow us to summarize in a single variable g the complexity condition of the user, and 
consequently following the ICF classification g is determined for each user. Assuming a limited scale g∈  [0,1]. 
The minimum value of g is set equal to zero and it indicates a low degree of complexity which has a low 
negative impact on the probability of the service, while the value 1 (maximum value of g) indicates a high 
complexity which has a greater negative impact on the probability of the service, 
Empirical Model 1: The probability depends only on the agent effort 
Assuming all the users homogeneous in terms of complexity, we consider that the probability p of the 
service provision depends exclusively on ef, that is the variable that describes the agent's effort: p=p(ef). 
The agent chooses the effort level, which maximizes his expected utility function. Deriving by ef we get:  
𝑝′(𝑒𝑓)[𝑢(𝛼) − 𝑢(𝛽)] =  𝑣′(𝑒𝑓)                                                                                                              ( 12 ) 




                                                                                                                                     ( 13 ) 
From equation 7 we can deduce that: 
- if 𝑢(𝛼) = 𝑢(𝛽), the incremental variations of probability 𝑝′(𝑒𝑓) with respect to the effort tends 
to  infinity and then  ef→0, if  𝑢(𝛼) > 𝑢(𝛽) , then ef>0 and if  𝑢(𝛼) − 𝑢(𝛽)  → ∞ , then ef→1. 
To every level of effort is associated a map of indifference curves describing the agent preferences in 
relation to α and β with respect to different utility values (Figure 1). 
                                                     
i For example different types of disability that could affect the probability of the realization of the service in many ways. Limits in the 
movements (limitations in walking, wheelchair) require specific technical skills in the provider and equipment (such as the elevator) 
in the vehicles. Behavioural problems, in a very wide meaning, may determine difficulties in communication, in the relation and 
stressing situations for both providers and users. Then, it may need more soft skills than technical ones. Furthermore behavioural 
problems could be related to some situation in which the user in sometimes is not collaborative and is not willing to use the service. 





Figure 2  Indifference curves with two different levels of effort (𝑒𝑓𝑗 > 𝑒𝑓𝑖)  and three levels of utility 
We can observe (Figure 2) that for each effort level, the slope of the indifference curves represents the 
agent’s marginal rate of substitution between α and β, and it is given by: 
𝑑𝛽
𝑑𝛼










< 0                                                          ( 14 ) 
We can deduce that, being decreasing and having different slopes for every effort level the agent’s indifference 
curves relative to the same utility level only cross once, and the single-crossing condition is satisfied. In the 
intersection point the agent obtain the same utility with different effort levels which are consequently 
considered equivalent. Without this property the preference system, the agent will always choose the less 
expensive in terms of effort indifference curve and then there will be no moral hazard (Stiglitz, 1983).Discrete 
effort: with only two possible values 
In this scenario we consider only two possible levels of effort: 𝑒𝑓𝐿 low effort and 𝑒𝑓𝐻  high effort, such 
that 𝑒𝑓𝐿 < 𝑒𝑓𝐻. 
Denoting 𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐻)  and  𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐿), the probabilities associated with each effort level, cetris paribus, we will 
have 𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐻) > 𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐿). 
From equation (7), given the utility level, the marginal rate of substitution with respect to the j-th effort, is: 





  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑗 = 𝐿, 𝐻                                                                                                ( 15 ) 
Then,  














Figure 3 Indifference curves 𝑒𝑓𝐿 and 𝑒𝑓𝐻for the same level of utility 
Figure 3 shows that the slope of the indifference curve 𝐼𝐻(𝑢) is steeper than 𝐼𝐿(𝑢).  This implies that, for 
the same level of utility , the indifference curve will have a point of intersection (point A) in which the agent 
is indifferent between 𝑒𝑓𝐻 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝐿 :  
𝐸𝑈𝐻(𝛼𝐴, 𝛽𝐴) = 𝐸𝑈
𝐿(𝛼𝐴, 𝛽𝐴)                                                                                                                 ( 17 ) 
Then the point A is the switching point: in A we observe the transition from one curve to the other in the 
agent’s preferences, but also, as it will be discussed shortly, in the contract that the principal proposes. Figure 
4 shows how to identify the set of contracts that would solve the problem of minimizing spending under the 
constraints of participation and incentive compatibility. On the left of point A, along the curve IH0, in the point 
B, that represent the contract (B, βB), the agent will find it profitable to choose 𝑒𝑓𝐿, obtaining the greater 
expected utility associated with the IL1 curve (greater than the expected utility associated with IL0). 
Notice that, in the point B, the incentive compatibility constraint, aiming at obtaining a higher level of 




Figure 4 Indifference curves and equilibrium points 
The following Figure 5 shows the line (dots line) of the feasible contracts Θ𝐿𝐻, given a level of utility  
 
Figure 5 Eligible contracts line 
In this scenario, in which we consider only two possible levels of effort, we rewrite the problem of 
constrained maximization referring to the principal (5) as follows: 
We look for a contract which solve the problem (12) by setting Kuhn-Tucker (1951) i system of equations.  
                                                     
i Appendix A  
max 
{𝛼,𝛽}
[−𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑃(𝛼, 𝛽)] = max 
{𝛼,𝛽}
 −[(𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐻)𝛼) + (1 − 𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐻))𝛽] 
Subject to 
𝑢(𝛽) + 𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐻)(𝑢(𝛼) − 𝑢(𝛽)) − 𝑣(𝑒𝑓𝐻) ≥ 𝑈0                       
(𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐻) − 𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐿))( 𝑢(𝛼) − 𝑢(𝛽)) ≥ 𝑣(𝑒𝑓𝐻) − 𝑣(𝑒𝑓𝐿) 
( 18 ) 
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Following Wallace’s method for a simple solution of optimization problems with inequality constraints 
(Wallace, 2004), we differentiate the Langrangean4 of the problem with respect to the 𝛼, 𝛽, and finding the 
solutions of the system of equality and inequality known as the necessary Kuhn-Tucker condition we obtain 
the candidate as solution of the problem. Since the sufficient Kuhn-Tucker conditions are satisfied, i.e., the 
objective function is differentiable and concave and the constraints are differentiable and convex, we are able 










                                                                                                                          ( 20 ) 
Which can be written in the following way in order to allow for a better understanding of the properties of 




= 𝜆 + 𝜇 (1 −
𝑝(𝑒𝐿)
𝑝(𝑒𝐻)




= 𝜆 + 𝜇 (1 −
1−𝑝(𝑒𝐿)
1−𝑝(𝑒𝐻)
)                                                                                                                                       ( 22 ) 
From these result we note that 𝜇 ≠ 0, because we are in a situation of asymmetric information. If it would 
be 0 then the incentive compatibility constraint cannot be satisfied. This result shows how the existence of 
the moral hazard problem implies a cost for the principal. 
We also note that, since 𝜇 > 0i, exactly as we assumed, the reimbursement of the agent varies with respect 
to the result obtained and in indirectly determined by the quotient  
p(eL)
p(eH)
. Greater is the ratio 
p(eL)
p(eH)
  and smaller 
will be the agent reimbursement.  
Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility function 
To better understand the theoretical model, we provide hereafter simulations by the use of an “explicit” 
functional form for the agent’s utility function. The function that has to be chosen must satisfy the conditions 
previously defined. 




 , 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑟 ≠ 1 ;  ii                                                                                                                                  ( 23 ) 
Where: 
r is the relative coefficient of risk aversion; 
k≥1 is the parameter representing the marginal effect of ef in terms of utility 
                                                     
i The Kuhn-Tucker condition impose that the multiplier μ of the incentive compatibility constraint must be non-
negative. 







We face a concave programming problem that can be written as: 
From which we derive the expressions of the two tariffs ( and β) that solve the problem of the principal: 
𝛼 = [(1 − 𝑟) (
1−𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐿)
𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐻)−𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐿)
) 𝑣(𝑒𝑓𝐻) − (
1−𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐻)
𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐻)−𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐿)
) 𝑣(𝑒𝑓𝐿) + 𝑈0]
1
1−𝑟







) (𝑒𝑓𝐿)𝑘 + 𝑈0]
1
1−𝑟
                                                                                                                                  ( 25 ) 
𝛽 = [(1 − 𝑟) (
𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐻)
𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐻)−𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐿)
) 𝑣(𝑒𝑓𝐿) − (
𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐿)
𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐻)−𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐿)
) 𝑣(𝑒𝑓𝐻) + 𝑈0]
1
1−𝑟







) (𝑒𝑓𝐻)𝑘 + 𝑈0]
1
1−𝑟
                                                                                                                                 ( 26 ) 
These expression are the solution of the minimization problem of the principal that, together with the partial 
derivatives (provided in Appendix B), allow us to understand how each variable impacts on the expected 
expenditure of the principal after the contract is set. 
Empirical Model 2: The probability of the service depends on the effort and the type of the user  
In this model we consider the probability depending both on the 𝑒𝑓 ∈ [0,1] and the type/severity of the 
user, such that by the complexity of his psycho-physical situation represented by the variable𝑔 ∈ [0,1]. Then, 
as in equation (1) we have p=p(ef,g).      
Let us recall some assumption we made. A higher level of effort determines a higher probability of success, 
while the type g of the individual negatively affects the probability. The agent's effort is endogenous, that is, a 
choice variable that the agent can arbitrarily set to maximize its utility, while patient’s severity is assumed to 
be exogenous and randomly distributed across patients. Since, due to the wide spectrum of implications and 
facets that a condition of disability can assume, the endogeneity of the variable that represents complexity 
contains the uncertainty deriving from the indispensable collaboration and acceptance of the service by the 
user. 
Since the variable describing the outcome of the service is binary (1 if the service is provided, 0 otherwise), 
it will have a binomial probability distribution. Each service has its own specific probability: every time the 
agent chooses a certain effort ef, the probability of outcome 1 ultimately will depend on the user type g. 
Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 show how the outcomes of the service (w) would be distributed with respect to 
the variables ef and g. The black dots indicate the "binary" outcome w of the service, according to the level of 
ef:  as effort increases, more likely outcome equal to 1 occurs.  
max {
{𝛼,𝛽}
−[(𝑝(𝑒𝐻))𝛼 + (1 − 𝑝(𝑒𝐻))𝛽]} 











) + (1 − 𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐻)) ( 
𝛽1−𝑟
1 − 𝑟
) − (𝑒𝑓𝐻)𝑘 > 𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐿) (
𝛼1−𝑟
1 − 𝑟
) + (1 − 𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐿)) ( 
𝛽1−𝑟
1 − 𝑟
) − (𝑒𝑓𝐿)𝑘 





Figure 6.1 Scatter plots representing the outcome variable 
and the effort variable ef 
Figure 6.2 Scatter plots representing the outcome 
variable and the user characteristics variable g. 
What it is shown in figure 6.1 is that for low values of ef many outcomes are 0 and for high effort values 
many outcomes are equal to 1.This figure explain tha assumption that effort may have an influence on the 
probability that different outcome may be achieved. Similarly, but in the opposite direction, is the influence 
of variable representing the the user complexity (g). In Figure 6.2 is shown that for low values of g many 
successes are obtained (w=1) and for high complexity values many outcomes equal to 0 are obtained. .  
Given W the dichotomous variable,  and p probability of positive outcome / success 𝑝 = 𝑝(𝑊 = 1), 
the expected value of W equal p in fact : 𝔼[𝑊|𝑋1 … 𝑋2] = ℙ[𝑊 = 1|𝑋1 … 𝑋2] = 𝑝 .
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Figure 7 Linear probability Model 
So the regression tool, estimating the expected value of the dependent variable, estimates a model of 
probability. In our study we consider only two explanatory variables then we model 𝔼[𝑊|𝑒𝑓, 𝑔] =
ℙ(𝑤 = 1) =  ℙ(𝑤 = 1|𝑒𝑓, 𝑔)ii. 
The application of a multiple linear regression model to a binary dependent variable is not adequate because 
it results in two types of problems. First, it establishes a linear relationship between the result variable and the 
explanatory variables: the model 𝑝(𝑤 = 1|𝑒𝑓, 𝑔) = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑒𝑓 + 𝑏2𝑔, as shown in Figure 7, represents a 
linear relation between the variables that implies a constant effect of the regressor on the outcome variable.  
                                                     
i 𝔼[𝑊|𝑋1 … 𝑋2] = 𝑝 ∗ 1 + (1 − 𝑝) ∗ 0 = 𝑝 = ℙ[𝑊 = 1|𝑋1 … 𝑋2] 
ii The regression estimates the expected values of the dependent variable 𝔼[𝑊] 
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The second issue, directly deriving from the first, is that the model could return values greater than 1 or 
smaller than 0, which is not admissible for a probability. 
Our response variable being a probability is limited both below and above, but it shows a peculiarity:  with 
respect to the causal variables that we take into consideration, it does not necessary have a linear trend, 
therefore it grows as the effort increases in a non-necessarily-linear way (and its shape is also affected by the 
value assumed by g). Based on these considerations, we decided to use the logistic function to represent the 
relationship described above. 
Logistic function 
The logistic function originally was proposed to represent the evolution of a population over time by 
Verhulst (1838)as an alternative to the Malthus model. It found many applications in various research fields 
(Berkson, 1944; Cramer, 2002).  
Considering x the independent variable and z(x) a dependent variable outcome (or performance), we write 




= 𝑏𝑧(𝑥) − 𝜑(𝑧(𝑥))                                                                                                            ( 27 ) 
Where 𝜑(𝑧(𝑥)) is the non linear component of the evolution of z(x). 
The following quadratic differential equation defines the logistic equation: 
𝑧(𝑥)̇ = 𝐴𝑧(𝑥) − 𝐵𝑧(𝑥)2                                                                                                         ( 28 ) 
Assuming that the growth of w depends on a constant γ>0 and on the distance to its extreme values 
𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑓 𝑒 𝑧𝑠𝑢𝑝, we rewrite the equation (14): 
𝑧(𝑥)̇ = 𝛾[𝑧(𝑥) − 𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑓][𝑧𝑠𝑢𝑝 − 𝑧(𝑥)]                                                                                          ( 29 ) 














                           ( 30 ) 
Setting  𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑓 = 0 e  𝛾




∗(𝑥−𝑐)                                                                                                                       ( 31 ) 




                                                                                                                           ( 32 ) 
Where 𝑎 = 𝑐𝛾∗, 𝑏 = 𝛾∗, 𝑘 = 𝑧𝑠𝑢𝑝. 
The logistic function has the following properties (Winsor, 1932): the inflection point, where the curve 
changes its concavity direction and with respect to which the function presents a symmetric behaviour, is at 
the point 𝑥 =
𝑎
𝑏
  and 𝑤 =
𝑘
2
. In the interval (0;
𝑎
𝑏
) the increase of x determines the increasing marginal variations 
in z. For𝑥 >
𝑎
𝑏
,, increasing x causes decreasing variations of z. 
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The point of intersection with the vertical axis is given by: 𝑥 = 0 e 𝑧 =
𝑘
1+𝑒𝑎






 𝑧(𝑥)(𝑘 − 𝑧(𝑥)). 
Generally the logistic function is used in its standard formula, uniquely identified by two parameters, µ and 








                                                                                                                                         ( 33 ) 
Set μ, s> 0 the position and scale parameters respectively: μ defines the center of symmetry of the curve 
and s acts on the shape of the curve. 




Increasing  𝜇, the inflection point moves to the right and therefore the value of x increases so that the yields  
  
Figure 8.1Standard Logistic Function Figure 8.2 Density Function of the  logistic distribution 











 go down. 
The scale parameter influences the shape of the curve and we note that increasing s and keeping μ fixed, 










 goes down. 
When the joint distribution of two variables tends to have a linear shape, equal variations of x correspond 
to constant variations of the variable w. We interpret the shape of the curve as the degree of sensitivity of the 
outcome to changes in the explanatory variable. So, in the case of the logistic function, for large values of s, 
in the interval x ∈ [0.1] the curve relationship tends to be straight and therefore the relationship between the 
                                                     
i We use 𝑒𝑓 ∈ [0,1] 
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variables tends to be linear. On the other hand, when s is small and the curve has a sigmoidal shape, unitary 
variations of x correspond to non-constant variations of z. 
Application to the transport service  
The scenario described in the present study presents characteristics which satisfy the conditions proposed 
by  
Pearl and Reed (1920) that make the logistic function suitable to represent the probability we are interesting 
to investigate in our model. 
Assuming a dichotomous outcome variable, the model estimate a probability. Obviously, the results are 
limited between zero (lower bound) and one (upper bound), the probability’s values vary continuously as the 
explanatory variables vary; and,  as we assume a non-linear relationship with the explanatory variables 
probability varies in a non costant way. 
In particular, for effort levels below a given threshold (i.e., below the inflection point), the marginal effect 
of a increase of ef on p is bigger with respect to points located above the afore-mentioned threshold. 
Since we have assumed the type of patient g to be exogenous we analyse the probability, according to the 
effort, given different levels of g.  
Then, according to our assumptions, the probability of the positive outcome is inversly correlated to the 
complexity of the patient. This assumptions can be represented by a higher value of 𝜇. To each complexity 
level 𝑔𝑗 corresponds a given 𝜇𝑗. In this way, for each j-th type of user, we can represent the distribution of 
probability as a logistic function, i.e., for each value 𝑔𝑗  we define p as a function of the effort: 







                                                                                  ( 34 ) 
 
Figure 9 The logistic model of the probability as function of the effort 
Provided that we are considering a market characterized by asymmetry of information and uncertainty any 
outcome can be granted for sure. Infact for any value assumed by the parameters 𝜇 and s, and considering 𝑒𝑓 ∈




Figure 50 Shape of the logistic curve according 
to μ 
Figure 6 Shape of the logistic curve according to s 
Looking at figures 10 and 11 we can make some consideration on the effect of 𝜇 and s on the probability. 
The marginal effect of effort in terms of probability increase when ef <μ and decrease when ef> μ. The 
parameter 𝜇 allows to identifiy the effort threshold under which the increase in ef is more effective and beyond 
which is less effective. Therefore, provided a given value of s, an increase of μ determines a shift to the right 
of the curve and, as a consequence, for each level of ef, an absolute reduction of expected probability (Figure 
10). Then, we assume that 𝜇𝑗 indicates the complexity of the j-th patient because having assumed that the 
complexity of the patient affects, indipendently from other variables, the probability of the outcome, the ability 
of the effort of be effective in obtaining positive results that is what parameter 𝜇 represent as just described. . 
In other words, the more complex the user is, the less is the influence of the agent effort on the probability of 
a positive outcome. 
Leaving μ unchanged, increments in the parameter s causes a reduction in the variability of the marginal 
effet of effort on the probabilityi.  In the interval ef∈[0,1] the curve tends to flatten, we interpret this factc as 
the variations in probability become less sensitive to variations in effort, because increasing s, the effort returns 
tend to become constant (Figure 11) and consequently the probability is less affected by variations in the effort. 
We use this observation to describe several types of services: a low specialization service will have a 
probability that is little affected by the agent's effort and then curve will be straight or even with downward 
concavity (s high); vice versa, a highly specilization service could be more influenced with a very marked 
sigmoidal curvature (s low).  
Based on these considerations, we assume the paramenter s describes the type of service. 
For a given level of user complexity  (𝜇), we describe three cases which, depending on the level assumed 
by s, represent highly specialized transport (typically disabled transport), medium specialized transport and 
little or no specialized transport (ordinary buses), in which two types of patients are compared (patient A with 
                                                     
i In figure 11 is show that the curve tends to become a straight line  increasing s. This implies that constant marginal 
variations in probability. 
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a lower degree of complexity and patient B with a greater degree of complexity). User A with a low level of 
complexity type 𝜇𝐴 = 0,5  and user B is an high severity type 𝜇𝐵 = 0,8. In the case of high specialization 
service we consider for 𝑠∗ = 0,2, for   medium specialization service 𝑠∗ = 0,5,   and for low specialization 






Figure 12 High specialization service Figure 13 Medium specialization service Figure 14 Low specialization service 
 
Figure 15 Comparison of different scenarios varyng the parameters µ and s 
3. Results: Simulation Analysis 
Although the attempt to simplify the reality under investigation, the service at stake contains several 
intrinsic characteristics that determine a considerable complexity, for this reason we have implemented various 
simulation analyses to understand and describe the model.  
Let us briefly recall the model and our assumptions. The dependent variable is the outcome of the transport 
service that we consider can be performed or not, that is, it can assume only two values zero and one.  We 
consider two causal variables, that influence the probability of the outcome in different ways: the agent effort, 
ef ∈ [0,1] which positively affects the probability and the variable describing the complexity of the user of the 
transport service, g ∈ [0,1] which instead has a negative impact on probability. The principal is risk neutral 
and aims at guaranteeing the service; in other words he looks to get high probability, minimizing the expected 
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costs. We assume that the principal, for the definition of the optimal contract, can consider different values of 
effort. 
The risk averse agent acts with reference to his own expected utility function (17), of CARA type, which 
is increasing in the reimbursement obtained for the work done and negatively affected by the effort applied 
because it creates disutility. 
In Table 1 is presented the simulation referring to the Empirical Model 1 in which the probability depends 
only on the agent’s effort. Risk aversion, probabilities value and reservation utility are varied separately to 
assess their impact on the values at stake.  
The subsequent simulations refer to the Empirical model 2 that considers the probability as function of both 
the agent effort and the user health complexity. The logistic functional form is applied to the probabilities, and 
in the simulations presented in Tables 2,3,4 parameters are varied ”independently” from each other. 
The last simulations present the dynamic of the contract with reference to two different scenarios: the first 
is referred to the scenario in which the user presents a medium health complexity level, while the second 
considers a high complexity user.  
3.1. Simulation Empirical Model 1: Probability depends only on the agent effort  
Two effort levels 
The first simulation refers to the scenario in which the probability only depends on the variable effort  and 
the users show the same complexity level. We consider the case, presented above, in which effort can assume 
only two values 𝑒𝑓𝐿 = 0 , 𝑒𝑓𝐻 = 1 (see Section 2 “Empirical Model 1”). The agent by choosing the effort 
level to be applied 𝑒𝑓𝐿 or 𝑒𝑓𝐻, determines respectively 𝑝𝐿  and 𝑝𝐻 , where 𝑝𝐿 < 𝑝𝐻 , i.e., the probability that 
the service is performed. We analyse what happens to the reimbursement values and to the principal expected 
costs, varying separately the probabilities values 𝑝𝐻 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑝𝐿, the reservation utility (U0) and the agent risk 
aversion coefficient (r) .The results reported in Table 1 are derived solving the minimization problem of the 
principal. (Software code shown in Appendix C). 
 
§ Principal Expected Cost; * Participation Constraint Lagrange multiplier (shadow prize);  ** Incentive Compatibility Constraint 
Lagrange multiplier (shadow prize) 
Table 10 Results of the simulation with two levels of effort 𝑒𝑓𝐻 = 1, 𝑒𝑓𝐿 = 0 







r 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 
 
0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5 
 
0,5 0,5 0,5 
 
0,2 0,3 0,6 0,8 
k 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1  1 1 1  1 1 1 1 
 𝑝𝐻 0,5 0,8 0,9 0,999 
 
0,8 0,8 0,8 0,8 
 
0,8 0,8 0,8 
 
0,8 0,8 0,8 0,8 
 𝑝𝐿 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2  0,3 0,4 0,5 0,7  0,2 0,2 0,2  0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 
𝑈0 10 10 10 10 
 10 10 10 10  5 1 0,5  10 10 10 10 
𝛼 40,11 32,11 31,04 30,26  32,49 33,06 34,03 42,25  10,03 1,36 0,84  15,73 19,27 43,76 59,83 
𝛽 21,77 23,36 23,59 23,76  22,09 20,25 17,36 2,25  5,44 0,11 0,01  12,90 15,35 29,40 27,01 
S§ 30,94 30,36 30,30 30,25  30,41 30,50 30,69 34,25  9,11 1,11 0,67  15,17 18,49 40,89 53,27 
𝛼 − 𝛽 18,34 8,75 7,45 6,49  10,40 12,81 16,67 40,00  4,58 1,25 0,83  2,84 3,92 14,36 32,82 
𝛼/𝛽 1,842 1,37 1,32 1,27  1,47 1,63 1,96 18,78  1,84 12,25 121,78  1,22 1,26 1,49 2,22 
𝜆* 5,5 5,5 5,5 5,5  5,5 5,5 5,5 5,5  3 1 0,75  1,72 2,39 9,24 23,91 
𝜂** 1,38 0,22 0,09 8E-04  0,32 0,5 0,89 8  0,22 0,22 0,22  0,02 0,04 0,55 3,31 
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Looking at Table 1 we note that as   𝑝𝐻 increases, principal expected costs decrease, in fact, ceteris paribus, 
if the probability of the transport with high effort increases, there are two element to be considered: first, when 
agent puts high effort, the risk of failure in absolute decreases, then the risk borne by the agent is reduced; 
second, the high effort level become relatively more effective in producing positive outcomes. As a 
consequence, the reduced risk determines a reduction in the risk premium, so the difference between the two 
reimbursements tends to decrease significantly. In particular 𝛼 decreases and 𝛽 increases; furthermore, the 
strength of the incentive-compatibility constraint is reduced by the fact that the agent is already incentivised 
by the resulting higher probability,  𝑝𝐻 and it is shown by the reduction of the weight of the incentive 
compatibility constraint, i.e. the parameter η.   
On the opposite increasing the probability with low effort exploited, 𝑝𝐿 , while keeping all the other 
variables constant, implies that the low effort becomes relatively more able to guarantee the transport and that 
the risk of negative outcomes is reduced in absolute.i In this case grows the probability of a success even with 
low effort, then, the incentive in exploiting high effort must be stronger than the opportunity deriving from 
low effort and it is observable in the increment of weight of the incentive constraint represented by η. This 
implies, that α increases and β decreases. As a consequence (α-β) increases and expected costs S increase. 
Clearly λ remains constant provided that it “depends” on the reservation utility. In fact the reservation utility 
is assumed equal to 10 in the first two scenarios. In the 4th scenario λ varies because the aversion to risk, and 
as a consequence the utility function, of the agent varies. On the other hand 𝜂 varies in the same direction of 
the expected costs variation implying that a lower premium to risk, in order to meet the incentive compatible 
constraint, is required.  
By reducing the reservation utility 𝑈0, the expected costs function is reduced, the weight of the participation 
constraint λ decreases and μ, the weight of the Incentive-Compatibility constraint, remains constant. 
As the risk aversion coefficient r increases, the expected cost function increases. This is in line with the 
fact that as the agent's risk aversion increases, his risk premium and therefore the principal's expenditure 
increases. λ increases and 𝜂 increases as well. 
3.2.  Simulation Empirical Model 2:  Probability depends on effort and complexity of user variables 
In the second empirical model, that considers the probability as a function of both the effort, ef ∈ [0,1] , 
and the user complexity g ∈ [0,1], we define the base scenario as follows: in the logistic formulation of  
probability to provide the transportation service, and considering that we are interested in analysing highly 
specialized services of transportation for disabled people, we assume s=0,2ii. 
                                                     
i Because, given  𝑝𝐿 ≤  𝑝𝐻, and  (1 − 𝑝𝐿) ≥ (1 −  𝑝𝐻), if  𝑝𝐿increases,  (1 − 𝑝𝐿) decreases and even  (1 − 𝑝𝐻) 
decreases 
ii Remember that, since the scale parameter of the logistic function represent the shape of the curve and then contains the 
sensibility of the result variable to the causal variable variations, we assumed that the s of represent the specialization of 
the service: the probability of a positive outcome is less influenced by the agent effort for highly specialized service (s 
low) than for service with  low specialization (s high) (for more details see section Logistic Function- Application to the 
transport service ). 
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Since we analyse a public service created and offered to selected categories of users, we consider as the 
base case the one in which the user has an average complexity µ=0,5 (See section 2 “Empirical Model 2” and 
Figure 10 , 11, 12, 13 and 14 for details on how the parameters are able to capture these  variables). We propose 
hereafter several simulations. First, we analyse what happens to expected costs and reimbursement values 
when there are only three relevant effort values: the extremes (ef=0, ef=1) and the point at which the logistic 
function changes concavity (the inflection point) that is where ef=µ. To be noticed that, on the left hand side 
of the inflection point probability (modelled as a logistic function) shows increasing marginal returns while on 
the right hand side marginal returns begin to decrease (Figure 9).  
In the second simulation we start by the definition of the level of effort necessary to guarantee a certain 
probability level. Subsequently, using these values, we compare what happens to principal’s expected costs 
with respect to three different users (with different severity). 
In the third simulation we focus on the effect of marginal effort variations on the variables of interest for 
the principal, i.e., probabilities, reimbursement values, expected costs, parameter S. 
Finally, the contract dynamics in two scenarios is presented. The base scenario (in which we consider an 
highly specialized service s=0,2 and medium complexity users, µ=0,5) and another scenario where the service 
is highly specialized (s=0,2) and the user present high level of complexity (µ=0,8)i. 
Comparison of different complexity users  
We analyse the expected cost minimization problem, with a probability function with the logistic form 
(equation 28), comparing a low level and a desired level ef^ of effort. We assume that the relevant effort values 
are only three: the minimum ef=0, the maximum ef=1 and inflection point ef=µ.ii Then we analyse what 
happens to the principal’s expected costs when he sets the minimum level of effort ef=0 and compare it with 
the desirable ef=1  and ef=µ separately (in Table 2 we refer to Case 1 and Case 2); and when he sets the lower 
effort level ef=µ and compares it with ef=1 (Case 3). Considering only highly specialized services, represented 
by the parameter s set equal to 0,2, we compare three users who differ each other by complexity levels: user 
A is assumed low complexity (µ=0,3), user B medium complexity (µ=0,5), and user C high complexity (µ 
=0,8). 
Assuming, also in this framework,  an agent with constant risk aversion (CARA)  utility (17) characterized 
by r=0,5, k=1 we compare the  three users A, B and C previously described, with respect to different ef^ 




                                                     
i See Note 12 and section Logistic Function  
ii The inflection point is considered relevant because, having modelled a sigmoidal growth of probability, for effort values 




Table 11 In the context of highly specialized service (s=0,2) Principal expenditure for different type of 
users 
Case 1  Case 2  Case 3 
efL=0 ef^=1    efL= 0 ef^= μ   efL= μ ef^=1  
 User A User B User C  User A User B User C  User A User B User C 
μ 0,3 0,5 0,8   0,3 0,5 0,8   0,3 0,5 0,8 
p(efL) 0,18 0,08 0,02   0,18 0,08 0,02   0,50 0,50 0,50 
p(ef^) 0,97 0,92 0,73   0,50 0,50 0,50   0,97 0,92 0,73 
α 9,11 9,27 10,17   8,32 9,27 10,99   9,13 9,27 9,71 
β 5,68 6,02 6,19   5,82 6,02 6,17   5,19 6,02 7,02 
𝜆° 3,00 3,00 3,00  2,56 2,75 2,9  3,00 3,00 3,00 
𝜂°° 0,02 0,05 0,19  0,37 0,35 0,43  0,04 0,10 0,37 
α-β 3,43 3,25 3,98   2,5 3,25 4,82   3,94 3,25 2,69 
S* 9,01 9,02 9,10   7,07 7,65 8,58   9,01 9,01 8,98 
EU** 5,03 5,08 5,27   4,80 5,00 5,30   5,03 5,07 5,25 
° Participation Constraint Lagrange multiplier (shadow prize);  °° Incentive Compatibility Constraint Lagrange multiplier (shadow 
prize)*Principal expected Cost,  **Agent Expected Utility 
Of course, it must be pointed out that Case 2 and Case 3 can only provide information on the trend of the 
variables of interest, because their formulation depends on the complexity of each user and on a priori 
knowledge of this value.  
The table can be summarized as follow. Increasing the complexity, within each case, the reimbursement 
values, α and β, and the agent expected utility, EU, increase. The principal expected costs, S, and the difference 
between α and β have different trends with respect to the increment of the user complexity, in particular, S 
increases in Case 1 and Case 2 but tends to decreases in Case 3; the difference (α-β)  has not a constant course 
in Case 1in which it decreases from user A to user B and increases from user B to user C; it increases in Case 
2 and decreases in Case 3. It is observable that for user B the reimbursement values are the same in each case, 
and consequently their difference. 
Isolating each user we note that principal expected costs decrease from case 1 to case 2 and increase to case 
3. The expected Utility has the same trend for user and B but opposite do user C, for which increases from 
case 1 to case 2 and decreases to Case 3.  The trend of the difference between the reimbursement values (α-β) 
for user A decreases from Case 1 to Case 2 and increases to Case 3, for user B it behaves in the opposite way 
and for user C it is decreasing from Case 1 to Case 3. 
For the principal the most convenient strategy, for every user complexity, is comparing efL= 0 with ef^= μ 
(Case 2) because the expected costs are always lower than in other cases. But this implies reaching the 
probability p(ef^)=0,5. For the agent Case 2 represent the case in which the expected utility has more variability 
with respect to the increment of user complexity. Furthermore, for the low complexity user (user A) the 
expected utility is lower than reservation value, this means that participation in contract could be not ensured.   
As seen in the previous simulation (Table 1) variations in  probabilities, p(efL) and p(ef^)= p(efH), ceteris 
paribus, have implications on the absolute risk of failure and on the relative ability of one effort level respect 
to the  other one to guarantee the positive outcome. 
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In Case 1, similarly to the previous simulation (Table 1), are compared efL= 0 and p(ef^)=1, and, as expected, 
increasing the complexity of the user, the respective probabilities decrease. This implies that the risk of failure 
(1-p) increase in absolute both with respect to high effort and low effort. As a consequence, the risk-averse 
agent, may require an higher reimbursement  β  (which is  received when the service is not performed) as  
compensation for negative results even if agent applies high effort. Furthermore, if p(ef^) is reduced the agent 
needs higher incentive to apply higher effort, because high effort has become relatively less convenient than 
low effort, and then α must increase then the strength of the incentive-compatibility constraint is augmented 
as shown by the fact that the respective Lagrange multiplier  η increases. 
In Case 2, in which principal incentives ef^=μ against efL=0, the desired probability p(ef^), is constant 
among different complexity users and p(efL) decreases with the increment of user complexity. If p(efL) 
decreases determines a higher risk of failure and a relative less opportunity in applying lower effort. As 
consequence of the augmented risk, β increases. The reduction in the relative convenience in applying low 
effort would imply a slack of the incentive constraint and then a reduction in α.  But, the increasing in user 
complexity determines exogenous uncertainty in the results that with the risk aversion of the agent determine 
that α increases. Finally the difference between the reimbursement values, α and β increases. We justify this 
result with a consideration: the reduction in the opportunity in applying low effort implies a slack of the 
incentive constraint that is weaker than the increased risk of not performing the service, therefore the risk 
premium increases. 
In Case 3 (in which principal incentives ef^=1 against efL=μ), the lower probability value p(efL)  remains 
constant and p(ef^) decreases. This implies that the risk of failure increases and that the higher effort level 
becomes relatively less suitable in ensuring a successful outcome. Consequently the weight of the incentive 
compatibility constraint increases, and α increases. Furthermore, the increased risk of negative outcomes 
determines that β increases as compensation. 
We observe that increasing the complexity of the user, both p(efL) and p(ef^) decrease. Then there is in 
general more risk and the  If p(efL) and p(ef^) decrease at different rates and their distance tends to increase 
when the transport is successfully done, it most likely that it comes from the application of high effort. 
Derivation of effort level to guarantee a given probability level  
As before, s specifies the degree of specialization of the service that is a highly specialized one, so s=0,2, 
and μ ≥ 0i represents the complexity of patient, the probability function is the logistic form (equation 28). The 
agent utility function is CARA (equation 17) and we consider U0 =5 the value of the reservation utility. 
In this simulation first we determine the value of the agent effort ef able to guarantee a certain level of 
probability p* desired by the principal for each type (in terms of complexity) of user. Secondly some 
considerations are made on the outcome variables such as reimbursement values, expected cost, expected 
utility. 
                                                     
i See Note 12 and section Logistic Function 
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The problem is to determine𝑒𝑓^  that satisfies  𝑝(𝑒𝑓^) ≥ 𝑝 ∗ 








≥ 𝑝 ∗ 










𝑒𝑓^𝑗 ≥ 𝜇𝑗 + 0,277 
This resulti suggest that the effort necessary to ensure a certain level of probability depends on the user  
complexity. Since we assumed ef ∈ [0,1], the inequality 𝜇𝑗 + 0,277 ≤ 1 must be satisfied, and then  𝜇𝑗 ≤
0,723. So, if 𝜇𝑗 > 0,723, the principal cannot guarantee the level of probability p* because it would require 
ef>1 . Then, fixed the probability level p*, the principal for each user complexity, can estimate the effort needed 
to guarantee that probability level. 
In the last column is shown that if the principal considers the worst situation of the complexity, i.e. 𝜇𝑗 =
0,8 >  0,723,and he set ef*=1  he will never reach the probability level desired. 
If he takes account of the best case scenario, i.e. 𝜇𝑗 =  0 (no complexity in the user) then he will set 
ef^=0,277. 
Here we first impose the level of probability ?̅? = 0,8  as the level aimed by the principal, then we solve the 
minimization problem for different users with some complexity ( 𝜇𝑗). 
                                                     
i Results for different objective level of probability are presented in Appendix in Table A1 
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Table 12 In the context of highly specialized service (s=0,2), Principal expected expenditure 
for different users, fixed desired probability 
𝑝∗ 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,8 0,799 
𝜇 0,3 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 
 𝑒𝑓𝐿  0 0 0 0 0 
 𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐿) 0,18 0,08 0,05 0,03 0,02 
𝑒𝑓^ =  𝑒𝑓𝐻 0,58 0,777 0,877 0,977 1 
α 8,3 8,97 9,33 9,7 10,09 
β 5,83 6,04 6,11 6,16 6,19 
 α-β 2,47 2,93 3,22 3,54 3,9 
S * 7,81 8,38 8,69 8,99 9,31 
S variation (% )   7% 4% 4% 4% 
EU**   5,57 5,77 5,87 5,97  6,07 
EU variation (%)  4% 2% 2% 2% 
*Expected cost **Agent Expected Utility 
We can see that the effort level desirable in order to guarantee a certain level of probability is not necessary 
always one. This is notable because, to define efficient contracts the principal knowing that could set less 
expensive reimbursements for less complex users. 
In Table 3 we see that, fixed p*, both the reimbursement values and expected costs increase with the 
complexity of the user. Variations are decreasing. The difference between the reimbursement values increase. 
If the principal set the probability level p*  and based on this defines the contract, what changes with the 
complexity of the user is the lower probability  𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐿), which decreases, and the effort required to guarantee 
p* Then, on the one hand reimbursement values could compensate the relative increment in the convenience of 
applying the higher effort respect lower effort (that would mean reduction of α) but the increment of the user 
complexity determines more uncertainty and finally that α increases. On the other hand the reduction in 𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐿) 
implies an absolute increment of the risk of failure, and then the participation constraint make β increasing.  
 If the agent would be able to apply exactly the necessary effort to guarantee the probability defined by the 
contract, he will increase his expected utility over the reservation value U0. 
Guaranteeing the probability level p* implies the definition of the effort level necessary to that, but anyway 
it could not be sufficient as shown in the last column, in which it can be seen that beyond certain levels of 
patient complicity it is not possible to reach the predetermined level of probability. 
How effort affect probabilities of the transport and expected costs of the principal 
This simulation is intended to understand the implications of effort variation in terms of payments, 
probabilities and expected expenditure. In Table 4 the variations in expected expenditure and in probabilities 
in the base scenario (highly specialized service, defined with s=0,2; and medium complexity user, defined 
with μ =0,5i) are presented. We maintain the previous assumptions: the logistic functional form of the 
probability (as in equation 28), the CARA as agent utility function (equation 27) and the agent reservation 
utility is U0=5.  
                                                     
i See Note 12 and section Logistic Function 
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Each column of Table 4 presents the optimal contract values (i.e. reimbursements, expected costs, and 
relative variations) which solves the principal problem comparing two near effort levels (the difference 
between 𝑒𝑓𝐿 and  𝑒𝑓𝐻   is 0,1). From left to right, it is implemented a growth of the efforts by steps of range 
0,1, i.e. from one column to the next are compared effort values which are respectively increased by 0,1, for 
each of them in parenthesis,  is indicated the relative probability. 
Table 13 Variations in Expected Cost and Probabilities deriving from effort variation  
 𝑒𝑓𝐿      
 ( 𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐿)) 0 (0,076) 0,1 (0,119) 0,2 (0,182) 0,3 (0,269) 0,4 (0,378) 0,5 (0,500) 0,6 (0,622) 0,7 (0,731) 0,8 (0,818) 0,9 (0,881) 
 𝑒𝑓𝐻      
( 𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐻)) 0,1 (0,119) 0,2 (0,182) 0,3 (0,269) 0,4 (0,378) 0,5 (0,500) 0,6 (0,622) 0,7 (0,731) 0,8 (0,818) 0,9 (0,881) 1 (0,924) 
α 12,71 10,54 9,44 8,91 8,72 8,72 8,84 9,03 9,26 9,53 
β 5,82 6,03 6,22 6,38 6,48 6,48 6,31 5,89 5,07 3,74 
S * 6,64 6,85 7,08 7,33 7,6 7,88 8,16 8,45 8,76 9,09 
Δα(%) - -17% -10% -6% -2% 0% 1% 2% 3% 3% 
Δβ (% ) - 4% 3% 3% 2% 0% -3% -7% -14% -26% 








55,70 37,55 26,33 19,42 15,20 12,66 11,16 10,34 9,95 9,84 
*Expected cost 
What is interesting is that reimbursements α and β have opposite growth trend: first α present an increasing 
variation, contrary β increases with a decreasing tendency. The inflection point is when lower probability 
𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐿) = 0,5 and higher probability is 𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐻) = 0,6. The probability increases with effort but with a 
decreasing trend. The expected expenditure grows in each effort increment with an increasing trend. 
Analisys of contracting dynamics  
Given the previous assumption on probabilityi, expected cost and utilityii function, as before, we fix the 
parameters of the agent utility function, r=0,5 ; k=1, and the reservation utility  𝑈0 = 5. 
In the context of highly specialized transport service (s=0,2) we analyse how it could be possible reaching 
an optimal contract in two different scenarios reducing the problems related to moral hazard and uncertainty. 
The base scenario (referred to a medium complexity user μ=0,5) and the high complexity user scenario ( with 
μ=0,8) with respect two strategies of the principal that are comparing different effort values to determine the 
reimbursement values. In Strategy A principal comparer  𝑒𝑓𝐿=0 and  𝑒𝑓𝐻 = 1. In Strategy B, are considered 
effort values with an infinitesimal difference, 𝑒𝑓𝐿=0,999 and  𝑒𝑓𝐻 = 1. 
The base scenario (s=0,2; μ =0,517)  
Strategy A In the first case, the principal compare  𝑒𝑓𝐻=1 with  𝑒𝑓𝐿=0. 
                                                     
i Logistic function form 
ii CARA agent utility function 
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STEP 1 the principal solves his minimization problem and, with respect to  𝑝𝐻=0,9241,  𝑝𝐿=0,075, 
determines the contract α = 9,2702, β = 6,0284 (point E1 in Figure 16),  for which  the expected cost is S = 
9,0243 and expected agent utility EU=5,0000000012. 
STEP 2 The agent, who knows that the effort cannot be observed by the principal and the reimbursements 
α  and β values, implementing a strategic behaviour, determines the effort that maximizes his expected utility 
with respect to the contract (α= 9,2702 and β = 6,0284), them he could obtain with ef=0,75, EU=5,07 but it is 
notable that this effort level determines p=0,78 which is lower than that foreseen by the contract 
The problem, therefore, is the fact that through a strategic behaviour, with less effort the agent obtains a 
better result, but the principal, on the other hand, remains “screwed” because a lower probability is determined. 
In Figure 16 are represented the indifference curves: 
The Red curves refers to the effort level desired by the agent, ef=0,75;  the Blue curves to ef=1 desired by 
the principal. The continuous line refers to reservation utility value U0=5 and the asterix curve (**) considers 
a higher expected utility value, U=5,07  the  achievable one with the agent strategic behaviour. 
 
Figure 16 Base scenario: The compromise contract 
We might describe the situation as following: 
- The principal, who would like to be on the curve Blue Line, is willing, in order to have p = 0.92, to spend 
something more and to give the agent  U = 5,07 and therefore pass on the Blue Asterix curve; 
- the agent , who would like to be on curve Red Asterix,  could agree to commit a little more and then exert 
ef = 1, to receive U = 5,07, then he accept to go down reaching curve Blue Asterix. 
Therefore, the intersection point between the Blue Asterix and Red Asterix curves determines the 
compromise contract (point E2 in Figure 16): x = 9,634483916 =α*, y= 5,022030=β* and the new value of the 
expected expenditure S= 9,28. 
However, the solution just presented is not an equilibrium because following the same reasoning above, the 
agent could always respond with a strategic behaviour (exerting ef=0,75) which leads to the smaller probability 
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p  = 0,783. The principal could only notice the rip-off (a posteriori) through the expense in fact in the case by 
observing the expense incurred. in fact, once the reimbursements are established on the basis of the effort 
exercised, obviously the expense differs ( Sef==1=9.284591555, Sef=0,75 = 8.635651806). 
Table 14 Dynamic of contract in base scenario-Strategy A 
 𝑒𝑓𝐻=1  𝑒𝑓𝐿 = 0       
 
STEP 1  
Blu Line 
 STEP 2  
Red Asterix 
 STEP 3 
 Red Asterix 
 STEP 4  
Blu Asterix 
α 9,2702  9,2702  9,6345  9,6345 
β 6,0284  6,0284  5,02203  5,02203 
𝑒𝑓  1  0,7500  0,7500  1 
p 0,9241  0,7773  0,7773  0,9241 
EU** 5,0000  5,0769  5,0735  5,0770 
S* 9,0243  8,5483  8,6073  9,2846 
*Expected cost,  **Expected Utility 
Strategy B: If the principal could take as a comparison a very close lower limit of effort  𝑒𝑓𝐿=, (we assume 
an infinitesimal effort difference  𝑒𝑓𝐻=1 with  𝑒𝑓𝐿=0,999) the probabilities would be very close: 
 𝑝𝐻=0,9241,  𝑝𝐿=0, 9237 
STEP 1 the contract resulting from the minimization problem of the principal, is: α = 9,6595, β = 2,8377 
with the expected expenditure S = 9,1420 and the agent expected utility EU=5. 
STEP 2 The agent with respect to the contract α = 9,6595 and β = 2,8377 knows that if he behaves correctly 
(therefore ef = 1), he would draw the expected utility of 5.  And if he implements a strategic behaviour, applying 
ef = 0,9995 will get: EU=5,0000005 really near to the reservation level. In this case the principal would have 
an expected expenditure equal to 9,1408 and p=0,924. 
Table 15 Dynamic of contract in base scenario with close effort levels- Strategy B 








 STEP 2 
Red Asterix 
 STEP 3 
Red Asterix 
 STEP 4 
Blu Asterix 
α 9,6595  9,6595  9,66028  9,66028 
β 2,8377  2,8377  2,8328  2,8328 
𝑒𝑓 1  0,9995  0,9995  1 
p 0,9241  0,9240  0,9240  0,9241 
EU** 5,0000000  5,0000005  5,0000005  5,000001 
S* 9,1420  9,1408  9,1412  9,1424 




Figure 17 Base Scenario with close effort levels 
With this strategy the agent has less reasons to implement strategic a behaviour, and even if he do the 
principal expected results are not so dramatically worst. 
High complexity user scenario (s=0,2; μ =0,8 i)  
In this scenario the only change regards the complexity of the user, then we analyse what happens when 
the user presents an high level of complexity then  μ =0,8 with respect to the same Strategies A and B. 
Strategy A: the principal, in defining the contract uses 𝑒𝑓𝐿= 0 and  𝑒𝑓𝐻= 1.  
 SETP 1. The principal by solving his constrained minimization problem in which it encourages the high 
effort level which determines  𝑝𝐻=0,731, defines a contract with α= 10,167 and β = 6,187 and from which the 
expected expenditure is  S = 9,0967 and the  agent expected utility is 5. 
STEP 2 Knowing the reimbursements α and β established by the contract, the agent takes action in order 
to maximize its expected utility. So, given α = 10,167 and β = 6,187, he determines the effort that would allow 
him to maximize his expected utility. But the resulting effort level would be an ef = 1,114 which is not possible 
because we assumed ef ∈ [0,1], so we set a constraint such that the effort satisfies the initial assumptions ef ≤ 
1. Therefore ef=1 and then  p=0,731 EU=5,0000000022.  
                                                     




Figure 18 High complexity User: a possible contractTable 16 Dynamic of 
contract in high complexity  scenario- Strategy A 




 STEP 2 
Red Asterix 
α 10,167  10,167 
β 6,187  6,1871 
ef 1  1 
p 0,7311  0,7311 




*Expected Cost,  **Expected Utility 
Strategy B: As before, we consider the situation in which the principal in the participation constraint uses 
as low  an effort value which is infinitesimally smaller than the desired one:  𝑒𝑓𝐻 = 1 and  𝑒𝑓𝐿 = 0,999. 
STEP 1 In this situation the resulting contract is described by:  𝑝𝐻=0,731,  𝑝𝐿=0,730, α = 9,838 β = 6,909 
and consequently  S = 9,051 and U=5,0000000011. 
STEP 2 The agent, maximizing its expected utility, implements a strategic behaviour applying an effort 
level equal to 0,9995 and therefore reducing the probability to 0,730. In this way, his expected utility is equal 
to 5,0000002880 which is very little greater than which one  deriving from correct behaviour. 
 Table 17 Dynamic of contract in high complexity scenario with close effort levels 
–Strategy B 








 STEP 2 
Red Asterix 
 STEP 3 
Red Asterix 
 STEP 4 
Blu Asterix 
α 9,838  9,838  9,838  9,838 
β 6,909  6,909  6,908  6,908 
ef 1  0,99950128  0,99950128  1 
p 0,7311  0,7306  0,7306  0,7311 












Figure 19 High complexity User with close effort levels: the compromise contract 
As in the basic scenario, this strategy reduces the opportunity for misconduct by the agent. And similarly 
to the strategy A, the moral hazard problem does not appear much relevant in terms neither of probability nor 
of expected expenditure. In step 2 the expected utility provides very small incentives in implementing unfair 
behaviours and consequently, it could be achieve a stable contract, without great inefficiencies even without 
looking for the compromise described in steps 3 and 4 which lead to almost the same results (Table 8). 
Results of model 1, summarized in Table 1, suggest that absolute and relative risk influence the weight that 
constraints (participation and incentive-compatibility) have on reimbursement values and principal expected 
costs and this appears in line with what might have been expected. In particular, the weight of the participation 
constraint seems to be mainly affected by variations in absolute risk of failure, because, being the agent risk 
averse must be supported the participation in the contract. The importance of incentive-compatibility constraint 
is related to the relative convenience of the effort values. If the probability deriving from the high effort (pH) 
increases, it becomes relatively more convenient for the agent to apply the high effort then the low effort, 
therefore the incentive to ef H has less weight. Conversely, if the probability of success even with low effort 
increases, to boost ef H becomes more important. 
In model 2 we introduced a variable representing the type of user, g, which for assumption affects negatively 
the probability of the service. Since our outcome variable is dichotomous (the transport in exploited or not), 
and that consequently its expected value coincides with the probability of the success, we modelled the 
probability of the outcome of the service with a logistic function which is widely applied for limited outcome 
variables. Given our focus on a highly specialized transport services, we fixed the parameter of scale s, as 
indicator of the specialization of the job, and let vary the position parameter μ, assumed as indicator of the type 
of the user. The parameter μ allows to identify the effort threshold under which the increase in ef is more 
effective and beyond which is less effective. Given these assumption and comparing three different users (in 
Table 2), we can see that growing μ both α and β and expected utility of the agent increase. But the variation 
in the expected cost differs with the strategy applied by the principal in defining the contract. In fact assuming 
the principal is able to know and compare not only the extremes but also relevant effort values, such as the 
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inflection point of the probability distribution, he could define different contracts as shown in Table 2 and 
obtaining different results in terms of reimbursement values, expected cost and utility.  
Results in Table 3 show what happens if the principal fixes a level of probability he wants guaranteed. The 
increment of the expected expenditure decreases with higher complexity of users, even if the difference 
between the values of the reimbursement increases. 
Furthermore, in Table 4 the contribution of effort variation is assessed: infinitesimal effort variations (equal 
to 0,1 points) determine quite constant  percentage variations in the expected costs. Respectively, 
reimbursement variations have symmetrical trends and tend to compensate each other. 
The last set of simulations provides a representation of the dynamics of contract implementation with 
respect to two scenarios: the base scenario with a medium complexity user and the provision of the service for 
user with high complexity. 
The base scenario allows us to understand the moral hazard and the opportunity for strategic behaviour that 
the agent has. When the user has medium complexity and the principal establishes the contract considering the 
minimum (0) and maximum (1) effort levels, what happens is that the agent is able to apply less effort to obtain 
a greater level of expected utility than that it would result from maintaining correct behaviour. In this case the 
expected expenditure will decrease but even the probability. Then the principal to maintain the probability 
level desired has to offer a compromise contract which requires higher expected costs (setting a higher 
reimbursement in the case of success and a lower otherwise, i.e. increasing the gap between the two payments 
as in Table 5). 
If the principal is able to anticipate the opportunistic behaviour of the agent, considering in the definition 
of the contract a higher value of low effort (very close to the high desired one as shown in Table 6), of course 
he will expect higher expenditure but he reduce the space for opportunistic behaviours. Furthermore, although 
it is clear that there is a margin for the agent to implement strategic agent behaviour, in this situation the 
differences are so small that a fairly satisfactory balance could be found for both parties. 
In the second scenario, referring to high complexity users, the problem of moral hazard is less evident. The 
simulation with the software suggested that, the only way for the agent to strategically exploit the contract 
would be to implement an effort level higher than 1 which is not possible. In Table 7 we see how in this case 
the problem of moral hazard is not relevant even if the agent manages in some way to obtain an expected utility 
even if slightly higher than that foreseen by the contract. 
Also in this case, as for the user of medium complexity, the differences in the final result between a correct 
behaviour and an opportunist one, are so small that a fairly satisfactory balance could be found for both parties. 
In both scenarios (scenario base and highly complex scenario) a contract that anticipates the agent's 
misbehaviour is more expensive than the one with milder criteria. Furthermore, it should be noted that the 
more expensive contract in the baseline scenario is more expensive than both contracts calculated for high 
complexity patients (Table 8). 
4. Conclusions 
What emerges from our work is that that the public service aimed at people with disabilities that we have 
presented, addresses two types of problems that are costly both in monetary terms and in respect of the resulting 
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outcome. The uncertainty of the result is attributable to the specific characteristics of the user and some 
inefficiency related to the incomplete information about the agent behaviour, which is able to worsen the result. 
The principal, in order to reduce the expected expenditure and guarantee certain levels of probability, has to 
reduce the possibility for opportunistic behaviours, incentivising the high effort levels but reaching both the 
objectives (reduced expected costs and high level probability) is not ensured and in some cases it could be very 
difficult to find a contract able to get over the moral hazard. 
To tackle the problem we have posed, first we set up a theoretical model that takes into account the 
information asymmetry with assumptions that simplify the analysis, subsequently these assumptions were 
"relaxed" so as to address more problems and criticalities related. Finally we proposed some simulations, which 
on the basis of the theoretical model and respecting the required conditions, try to provide a comprehension, 
even if only partial, of a complex reality. 
The inclusion of the variable g that describes the type of patient makes the description of the problem more 
realistic and allows to define the contract in a more coherent way with the actual task that the agent has to 
perform and to justify the expense incurred by the principal. Obviously, it does not allow to reduce the 
uncertainty of the result, since the final result depend not only on agent’s action, but also on a random variable, 
(that is the type of users), it is also a random variable, but taking into account of the random causal variable 
allows to highlight from which component the uncertainty and negative results derive, and consequently to 
evaluate whether they can be reduced or not 
The choice of probability formulation as a function of effort and complexity of the patient in the context of 
disabled transport, intended as a highly specialized service, seemed useful and usable, even is evident that is 
one of the possible way to represent the problem. 
First, we have, effectively highlighted the possibility of moral hazard behaviours thus confirming the real 
problem inherent this transport service: possible incorrect behaviours lead to compromise solutions that require 
a higher expected expenditure. 
Secondly, the fact that the agent implements strategic behaviours in situations of less serious patients in 
which the probability that the service is performed is less affected by the effort. In situations where patients 
have high levels of complexity, the maximum probability obtainable with the maximum level of effort is 
already reduced and the agent's effort is less able of influencing it. Therefore, it appears that the agent, when 
users are very complex, is less likely to engage in incorrect behaviour, which would further reduce the 
probability of success. 
Our analysis confirmed the trade-off between the principal goals, to ensure that the service is performed 
with high probability and to contain expenditure, basically because, high probability requires high effort and 
then an increase in the expenditure. And even that the increment in expected costs is attributable both to 
complexity of the user and in opportunistic misbehaviour of the agent.  
The user complexity, on one side reduces the probability of a positive outcome, even in case the agent puts 
high effort in his job. This can lead to a variation (reduction) in the relative convenience of the efforts and 
consequently in the need of more incentive to high effort. On the other side, user complexity is related with 
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the growth of exogenous uncertainty and then determine higher absolute risk of failure in performing the 
service, then the contract could compensate the risk averse agent. 
The unfair actions of the agent could create higher expected cost because a compromise contract which try 
to avoid moral hazard, increases the reimbursement values and leads to a worse result for the principal in term 
of expenditure. 
Of course the complexity of the user in unchangeable so primarily the policy maker should focus on 
reducing the moral hazard opportunity. 
We show that a possible strategy, to reduce the margin of opportunity for incorrect behaviours, could be 
the definition of contracts that consider very close efforts in the incentive-compatibility constraint.  
However, since we have seen that the base scenario lead to a compromise contract which is more expensive 
(in expected terms), than the high complex user scenario which is worse from the probability point of view. In 
first scenario, seems prevailing the monetary lost due to the moral hazard. In the case with high complexity 
user what is more concerning is the lower probability, because the expected cost are lower than in the base 
scenario. 
Given these observations, a possible way to reduce the inefficiency deriving from user complexity is take 
into account that different complexity levels affect in various way the outcome. And a solution to face the 
exogeneity of the user complexity and to limit the problems resulting from the incomplete information, could 
be to define different contracts for different types of users, so as to isolate the respective relative criticisms and 
therefore reach more appropriate solutions. 
The first evident limitation of this discussion concerns is not having considered a principal's benefit 
function. In fact, as principal objective we used the minimization of expected cost. The main reason, which 
partially justify this lack, derives from the fact that the work has a more empirical than theoretical value and 
describes a phenomenon of reduced dimensions. This is because we describe a service that, in each municipal 
reality has its own consistency in terms of expenditure, but from which few people benefit, therefore inserting 
a welfare function seemed redundant. 
Another important limitation that derives from the lack of administrative data is the absence of an empirical 
analysis. But as mentioned in the previous point, the small number of users in each municipality has not, so 
far, motivated the possibility of forming consistent databases. 
We also note that contract theory inherent the provision of healthcare service, from which we started, often 
uses the quality as unobservable outcome variable, which we ignored. This lack is motivated from the fact that 
the service considered here is less articulated than health care, is limited in the time and it is more similar to 
the taxi service, for which we assume the transport realized by car from one point to another is most important 
aspect. 
These limitations suggest the further work would first focus on the collection and analysis of data on 
disabled people transportation service derived from municipalities. Secondly, it seems relevant comparing the 
various solutions implemented in different municipalities with respect the definition the user of the service, 
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the contract offered. Finally, based on the features derived from the evidences collected from reality, it could 
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Appendix A   
The optimization problem. The Lagrangian of the problem:  
 
  𝐿 = −𝛽 − 𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐻)(𝛽 − 𝛼) + 𝜆(𝑢(𝛽) + 𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐻)(𝑢(𝛼) − 𝑢(𝛽)) − 𝑣(𝑒𝑓𝐻) − 𝑈0) +  µ((𝑝(𝑒𝑓
𝐻) − 𝑝(𝑒𝐿))( 𝑢(𝛼) −
𝑢(𝛽)) − 𝑣(𝑒𝑓𝐻) + 𝑣(𝑒𝑓𝐿)) 
















𝑢(𝛽) + 𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐻)(𝑢(𝛼) − 𝑢(𝛽)) − 𝑣(𝑒𝑓𝐻) − 𝑈0 ≥ 0;  𝜆 ≥ 0;  𝜆(𝑢(𝛽) + 𝑝(𝑒𝑓
𝐻)(𝑢(𝛼) − 𝑢(𝛽)) − 𝑣(𝑒𝑓𝐻) − 𝑈0) = 0 
 
(𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐻) − 𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐿))( 𝑢(𝛼) − 𝑢(𝛽)) − 𝑣(𝑒𝑓𝐻) + 𝑣(𝑒𝐿) ≥ 0;  µ ≥ 0; µ ((𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐻) − 𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐿))( 𝑢(𝛼) − 𝑢(𝛽)) − 𝑣(𝑒𝑓𝐻) + 𝑣(𝑒𝑓𝐿))
= 0 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary for a point to be a solution of the problem: each point that satisfies the K-T conditions, 



























𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐻) − 𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐿) 
𝑣(𝑒𝑓𝐿) −
𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐿)
𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐻) − 𝑝(𝑒𝑓𝐿) 
𝑣(𝑒𝑓𝐻) + 𝑈0 
 








































Sol := solve({FOC1 = 0, FOC2 = 0, FOC3 = 0, FOC4 = 0})=  
={a = 32.11111111, b = 23.36111111, lambda = -5.500000000,  mu = -0.2222222222} 


















Definition of the effort desired by the principal given the probability desired 
Table A1 
p=0,5 𝑝(𝑒𝑓) > 0,5 𝑒𝑓 > 𝜇𝑒𝑓 
p=0,7  𝑝(𝑒𝑓) > 0,7  𝑒𝑓 > 𝜇 + 0,1695 
p=0,8  𝑝(𝑒𝑓) > 0,8  𝑒𝑓 > 𝜇 + 0.2772 
p=0,9  𝑝(𝑒𝑓) > 0,9  𝑒𝑓 > 𝜇 + 0.4394 




Appendix F  
Definition of the effort desired by the principal given the probability desired (Table 3) 













Appendix G  
How the effort affect probabilities of the transport and Expected expediture of the principal 








Appendix H  































A := [[5.07696815667237722, [em = 0.757175844312259]]] 
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